Russia has proven itself to be a master of diversion, adept at exploiting ethnic divisions, supporting hardline nationalist politicians, and complicating slow reform efforts in the region.
The Kremlin has continuously demonstrated that the Balkans is a favorable environment for counteracting the United States and the European Union (EU). The many ethnic, political, and social fractures in the region, along with widespread disappointment over the slow pace of Euro-Atlantic integration, offer Moscow easy opportunities to disrupt the post-Cold War European order.
The Kremlin’s history includes its long-standing refusal to recognize the independence of Kosovo, an audacious coup attempt in Montenegro, support for separatist-minded leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and covert efforts to target arms supplies to Ukraine and stir internal or interstate tensions. Despite harsh international criticism of its war against Ukraine, the Russian government shows no signs of abandoning such severe behaviors or tried-and-tested tactics, such as co-opting corrupt local elites. However, the longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more difficult it will be for Balkan leaders to sit idly by or play Moscow and Brussels off each other.
Russia pursues several strategic objectives in the region. It seeks to prevent Western Balkan countries—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and especially Serbia—from joining the EU. It also aims to suppress NATO aspirations in other Balkan states that have not yet become alliance members and to disrupt NATO activities in the region. By fostering anti-Western sentiments and corrupt interests throughout the Balkans, Moscow exacerbates the governance shortcomings in the region and undermines internal reforms that are prerequisites for further integration into Euro-Atlantic economic, political, and security structures.
Moscow has long capitalized on Serbia’s persistent dissatisfaction with NATO’s 1999 campaign that led to the creation of Kosovo as an independent state. Amid frequent tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, the large NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo continues to play a significant role in regional stabilization efforts, as demonstrated by the tensions that flared this summer between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo over license plates. While Moscow stood aside during the recent crisis, provocative rhetoric from Russian officials unnecessarily heightened overall tensions. At the same time, Moscow’s self-serving narrative and moderate support among Serbs for Vladimir Putin as a counterbalance to the West are making life difficult for policymakers in the U.S. and EU. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s relationship with Putin has long been complex, though he frequently caters to pro-Russian sentiments in his country for his political goals.
Russia’s intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains an ongoing threat. The Kremlin has long-standing ties with Milorad Dodik, the leader of one of the country’s two federal entities, Republika Srpska, as well as with prominent Bosnian Croat politician Dragan Čović, whose behavior undermines the stability of Bosnia’s complex power-sharing arrangements. Russian support and training have facilitated the transformation of Dodik-led security forces in Republika Srpska into a quasi-military force, contrary to the Dayton Peace Agreement. Less than two weeks before Bosnia and Herzegovina’s parliamentary elections on October 2, 2022, Putin hosted Dodik in Russia—a sign of support for the Bosnian Serb politician, suggesting that Moscow still seeks to influence the country’s politics.
Another short-term issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina is whether Moscow will support the extension of the UN mandate for the EU peacekeeping force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was set to expire on November 2, 2022. Russian officials have remained silent about their plans, but blocking the extension could backfire if Europeans decide to bypass Russia and unilaterally extend the mission at Sarajevo’s request. Despite the war in Ukraine, the West has not been distracted from the risks of destabilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU increased its EUFOR mission from 600 to 1,100 soldiers earlier this year, and NATO troops stationed in Italy remain ready to deploy to Bosnia if needed.
Russia’s arsenal is rich in symbolism and subversive instruments. However, it has surprisingly few tangible benefits to offer countries that need more stability and prosperity. Instead, Russia’s hand is more visible in intelligence operations and GRU (military intelligence) activities across the region, including the destruction of arms depots in Bulgaria, a failed surveillance attempt at a military facility in Albania, a potential cyber attack in Montenegro, and widespread disinformation, propaganda, and political interference operations. U.S. officials have long targeted a Russian “humanitarian aid” center in Serbia, warning that it could serve as a hub for “espionage or other nefarious activities.” Moscow and Minsk have previously provided excessive military equipment to Belgrade. In return, Serbia has regularly participated in annual Slavic Brotherhood military exercises with Russia and Belarus. Under EU pressure, Serbia withdrew from the 2020 exercise when Minsk targeted opponents of President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime, only to rejoin in 2021.
However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has strained bilateral relations between Russia and Serbia. Belgrade voted in favor of a UN General Assembly resolution in March 2022 condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Serbian nationalists were alarmed that Moscow cited Kosovo as a precedent for recognizing the separatist entities of Luhansk and Donetsk as independent states. Serbia is also said to have allowed the UK and France to use its territory as a transit point for non-combat military supplies.
Russia’s “soft power” has only been sporadically successful. Russian politicians express particular affection for the “brotherly” South Slavs and value the relations between the Russian and Serbian Orthodox churches. Far-right nationalist and religious groups are receptive to Moscow’s attempts to promote “traditional values,” as seen on August 28 in Belgrade, where protesters against an upcoming Pride Parade carried Russian flags and the pro-war “Z” symbol. Vučić responded by canceling the planned parade and warning that Serbia had become the stage for a conflict between East and West, emphasizing the challenges it faces in balancing Russia and the EU.
At the start of the pandemic, Russian planes delivered PPE to Serbia, which eventually purchased doses of the controversial Russian Sputnik V vaccine and began a local production facility for well-connected Russian vaccine supporters. At the same time, Serbia pursued a careful multivector approach, ensuring it bought additional COVID vaccine doses from Chinese and Western suppliers and established business relations with American, Chinese, and European pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Russian influence is most apparent in the economic sphere. All Balkan countries rely heavily on Europe for trade and investment due to their geographic proximity and general trade orientation. For example, the EU accounts for 60% of Serbia’s foreign trade. Serbia exported goods worth around 14 billion euros to Europe in 2021; in contrast, exports to Russia in 2020 reached only 911 million euros—4.7% of the country’s total exports. With the exception of Kosovo, the countries of the Western Balkans benefit from the EU’s visa-free regime, which facilitates travel and migration for employment purposes and remittances from Europe. These ties strengthen the EU’s influence and soft power. Serbia and Montenegro have also become a haven for thousands of Russian émigrés who oppose the war and internal repression of dissent.
EU sanctions on Russian energy exports are likely to severely limit Russia’s economic presence in the Balkans and disrupt some of the long-standing oil and gas flows between Russia and the region. Serbia has visibly resisted EU pressure to join the sanctions regime, which has had a negative impact on NIS, the country’s largest oil company. Until recently, Gazprom Neft held the majority of shares and was a significant symbol of Russia’s political and economic influence in Serbia. However, Croatia is planning EU sanctions that will prevent NIS from importing Russian oil starting in December. Fearing further secondary sanctions, Vučić has hinted that he may have to nationalize NIS in the fall and sell Gazprom Neft’s remaining shares to another buyer to keep it operational.
Russia’s gas war with the EU has spilled over into the Balkans, although the region’s energy dependence on Moscow has long been exaggerated. Serbia secured a three-year contract for Russian gas with heavily reduced prices in May 2022. The treaty angered EU members, although its implementation remains uncertain. However, the volume of Serbian gas imports from Russia is relatively small, amounting to only 3 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. The total percentage of gas in Serbia’s energy mix is less than 15%. Bulgaria imported about 3 bcm of gas per year from Russia until Moscow shut off the taps in April 2022. The share of gas in the country’s energy consumption is also relatively low, comparable to Serbia’s. Greece imports 6 bcm of Russian gas annually, accounting for 30% of its gas consumption. Gas makes up just over a quarter of the country’s total energy consumption, but Athens plans to open several new LNG regasification terminals that could benefit the Balkan states.
In the future, Western Balkan countries will need to balance the risk of angering the EU or the United States with the marginal benefits of buying gas from Russia or maintaining business relations with Moscow. The ongoing European energy crisis is affecting regional energy markets. Possible changes include increased efforts to develop cross-border energy exchanges, new pipeline interconnectors, greener energy projects, and, in the long term, higher investments in new LNG terminals that could allow the region to tap supplies from the Caspian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The first of these LNG terminals, a floating structure in Greece, is scheduled to begin operations in September 2022. If the EU supports these diversification efforts, Russia’s energy leverage in Southeastern Europe may not be as potent as it once was. Certainly, such changes will take time and massive investments, neither of which is guaranteed.
Nevertheless, Russia remains a dangerous actor in the Western Balkans. It has proven itself capable and willing to play the disruptive game in regional./ The Geopost
