“No member of a counting team may count or fill in the votes of their own party.”
This is stated in Article 21, Paragraph 3, of Electoral Regulation No. 16/2024 on Municipal Counting Centers, adopted by the Central Election Commission (CEC). However, it remains unclear whether this essential rule was properly enforced in the counting of parliamentary candidate votes.
The regulation aims to prevent political influence and potential manipulation during the counting of votes for deputies. Yet, questions have arisen about whether the CEC effectively supervised the enforcement of this prohibition in practice.
Concerns have intensified following the recount at the Municipal Counting Center (QNR), which revealed serious irregularities and potential manipulation in the counting of candidate votes. These findings raise significant questions about how the counting process was managed and whether the teams adhered to the principle of impartial task allocation.
If it turns out that counting team members were involved in tallying votes for their own parties, it would constitute a direct violation of CEC regulations and a failure by the commission to enforce its own rules. Such a scenario would undermine both the legal framework and public trust in the electoral process.
Counting by Party-Appointed Commissioners
Under the Law on Elections, vote counting at the Municipal Counting Centers is conducted by members nominated by political parties, with priority given to council members who served on election day.
It is the CEC’s responsibility, through secondary regulations, to determine the number of counting groups, the organization of work, and the allocation of tasks among group members.
As required by law, the CEC’s electoral regulation legitimizes the inclusion of political representatives in the counting process. According to Article 20 of Regulation No. 16/2024, counting teams at Municipal Counting Centers are composed to reflect political representation in the Municipal Election Councils to the extent possible.
The regulation also specifies that team leaders are selected from the four political parties with the most votes in the previous election, following a rotation formula applied by the Municipal Election Centers (KKZ). This means that vote counting is directly entrusted to party-appointed commissioners who have a vested interest in the results.
Risk of Conflict of Interest
In principle, this system is intended to create a balance of political oversight among competing parties. However, in practice, it carries a serious risk of conflict of interest, particularly if the legal prohibition preventing team members from counting their own party’s votes is not strictly enforced.
The recent recount in QNR, which revealed manipulations in parliamentary candidate votes, makes this framework even more problematic. It raises questions about whether rotation and task allocation were implemented correctly, whether party commissioners had direct access to the votes of their own parties, and whether the CEC exercised effective oversight to enforce its own regulation prohibiting such practices.
