Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is closely cooperating with Russia, including on security and arms issues. Now, he is threatening to invade Kosovo, which Serbia does not recognize as an independent state. If Donald Trump were to win and NATO were weakened, Vučić might be ready to move.
“We will wait for the right time and seize our opportunity…” was the ominous warning last weekend from Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, with the perspective that the West strongly backs Kosovo while the long Balkan conflict continues to heat up.
It is worth noting that Vučić had already spoken in December with admiration for the current and former Presidents of Azerbaijan, who had waited a total of 27 years for the “right time” and geopolitical circumstances to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. Last September, Vučić positioned Serbian troops on the border with Kosovo after Serbian paramilitaries attacked Kosovar police and entrenched themselves in a monastery.
Against this backdrop, it’s hard to see anything in his recent words other than a threat. A new Balkan war is not inevitable, but the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo has been reaching a boiling point for months. It’s about the status of Kosovo as an independent state, which Serbia does not recognize. The EU and the USA have been trying to find a solution for years, but the situation is stalled.
Should the West prepare for a worst-case scenario in the medium term, or are the Serbian president’s words just rhetoric?
Vučić’s Interests
An American intelligence report warns of an “increased risk” of ethnic violence this year and cites the Serbia-Kosovo conflict as a prime example.
“The motivation for Vučić to keep this crisis simmering is significant,” says Florian Bieber, Director of the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz.
Russia also has an interest in all this: as Europe’s inner courtyard, a conflict in the Western Balkans would be devastating for the West.
Vučić essentially has three options: a resolution, escalation, or maintaining the status quo with targeted provocations.
The first option would be for Serbia to recognize Kosovo or at least normalize relations. But a resolution would deprive Vučić of a significant issue he uses both domestically and internationally. The conflict not only serves to draw nationalist sentiments across Serbian society but also helps him position himself as a crisis manager in the international context.
The second option – escalation – could manifest as a Serbian military offensive against Kosovo or as the provocation of major disturbances in northern Kosovo. This possibility is largely theoretical because, in practice, soldiers of the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force would immediately intervene, and the USA would be called to action. Besides, Serbia would lose its prospects in the EU. None of these is in the government’s interest.
Both Firestarter and Firefighter
This leaves the third option: maintaining the status quo with targeted provocations. According to Bieber, Vučić “is stirring up tensions so that a later de-escalation back to the status quo is considered a success.” In other words: Vučić is both a firestarter and a firefighter. But there’s a significant risk that a miscalculation could lead to an actual fire.
Vučić is likely also hoping for different geopolitical conditions. For example, a win for Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential elections. A radical weakening of NATO could also have a new impact on Vučić’s calculations.
As president, Trump had been in favor of a territorial swap between Serbia and Kosovo. This envisioned the north of Kosovo, with its local Serbian majority, going to Serbia, while the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia, where there’s a local Albanian majority, would be incorporated into Kosovo. However, experts had warned that any border change could be the prelude to a new regional conflict.
Playing with Nationalism
A few years ago, Vučić was still considered a pro-European. But his political career started in Serbian ultra-nationalism. He was the Minister of Information during the time of war criminal Slobodan Milošević and drastically restricted the work of the media during the Kosovo war.
At his core, he has a nationalist and anti-Western worldview. The year 2008, when Vučić was 38 years old, marked a turning point. He suddenly acknowledged Serbian war crimes and said he had changed.
“He realized that you can’t win elections with an anti-Western line. He is a man sharply focused on power,” says Bieber about Vučić’s supposed change of mind.
But Bieber wouldn’t describe the Serbian president as ideology-free. “At his core, he has a nationalist and anti-Western worldview. Depending on his strategy, he sometimes dismisses this,” he says.
Moscow’s Support
Russia is Serbia’s most important ally on the Kosovo issue. It will help Serbia defend its “legitimate” national interests, the Russian Foreign Ministry has stated in the
past. Belgrade has not joined Western sanctions against Russia and cooperates with Moscow on security, arms, and economic issues. At the same time, the country is said to have supplied arms to Ukraine, as indicated by leaked American intelligence documents.
Daniel Sunter from the Balkan Security Network, a Belgrade-centered platform focusing on defense and security, describes Serbia’s foreign policy as a four-pillar strategy: the EU, the USA, Russia, and China. Serbia relies on the latter exclusively because of the Kosovo conflict, a defense for Serbia’s position.
Sunter attributes Vučić’s incendiary rhetoric to the stalled negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. This has drastic consequences for the Western Balkans.
“A practical and long-term solution needs to be found. The region needs to be integrated into the EU as quickly as possible. Who knows what else might happen here in the future,” he says.
The complexity of Serbia’s position on Kosovo, influenced by both internal nationalist sentiments and the geopolitical interplay with major powers like Russia and the West, underscores the delicate balance Vučić is trying to maintain. With Moscow’s support, Vučić navigates between escalating tensions for internal political gains and the reality of Serbia’s European integration aspirations. This balancing act, however, is fraught with risks, not just for Serbia and Kosovo, but potentially for the stability of the entire region.
Source: Botasot.net