As Serbia enters a new election cycle, the proliferation of so-called “local media” illustrates a deliberate attempt to manipulate public perception while maintaining the facade of media freedom. In early 2026, ten new local portals appeared across the Serbian media landscape, all sharing the same ownership, editorial staff, registration date, and narrative. These outlets are registered under the Novi Sad-based company Zaple Media Group, directed by Gradimir Banković, a known associate of the Center for Social Stability (Centar za društvenu stabilnost, CZDS).
The first three portals – Srbija na istoku, Palanačke vesti, and Glas Aranđelovca – were all registered on January 9, 2026, and by February, the network expanded to ten portals. They focus on municipalities with upcoming local elections: Aranđelovac, Bor, Bajina Bašta, Kladovo, Knjaževac, Kula, Lučani, Majdanpek, Smederevska Palanka, and Sevojno.
This is not coincidental. It reflects a strategic, politically motivated effort to build a coordinated political-communication infrastructure capable of micro-targeting local populations. Local elections offer an opportunity for the ruling party to “translate” national narratives into communities, presenting their governance as stable, developmental, and effective. Local media serve as the most efficient channels for this messaging, shaping public opinion at the grassroots level.
Local media: From information to propaganda
Local media in Serbia are uniquely positioned as the primary communication channel between authorities and citizens. However, when these outlets are controlled by political actors, they cease to inform objectively and instead become instruments of political messaging. Communities receive only content that serves the interests of the ruling structures, while transparency, accountability, and independent verification are sacrificed.
The establishment of multiple portals under the same owner and editorial direction linked to CZDS, a pseudo-civilian organization praised by President Vučić and Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, demonstrates how state-backed entities create the illusion of pluralism. Gradimir Banković, who oversees all ten portals, publicly represents CZDS, highlighting the intertwining of political structures, pseudo-civilian organizations, and media networks.
These portals are not intended to reach mass audiences but rather to dominate local ecosystems, spreading content through social networks and communities. Coordinated ownership ensures uniform narratives across multiple outlets, giving the appearance of diversity while actually consolidating control.
Political manipulation under the guise of media freedom
The current pattern shows a systemic strategy by the Vučić regime to maintain political control through local media. By establishing new outlets ahead of elections, funding them via public resources, and coordinating their content, the government effectively turns independent journalism into a tool for propaganda. While Serbia maintains a formal pluralistic media framework, editorial independence is largely absent, and local media have become mechanisms for amplifying pro-government messaging, rather than serving the public interest.
Financially, these outlets are supported through state budgets, advertising, and public tenders, creating dependence on political will. In 2025 alone, over €13 million from state competitions went to pro-government media, while independent outlets were systematically marginalized. The creation of these networks ahead of elections ensures preference for government-aligned content, while alternative voices and critical analysis are suppressed.
Regulatory vacuum and accountability failure
Three key issues underpin this system: lack of transparency in media registration, poor enforcement of media law, and a politically blocked regulatory environment. The absence of an active media regulator allows these coordinated networks to operate with minimal oversight, effectively normalizing a gray zone of political-media control. While technically legal, the establishment of these media networks violates the spirit of electoral fairness by creating pre-election infrastructure designed to influence public opinion and marginalize dissent.
Conclusion: The illusion of pluralism
In Serbia, democracy is undermined not by the absence of media, but by the creation of controlled media ecosystems masquerading as pluralistic outlets. Local media, which should be closest to citizens and most relevant to their daily lives, are transformed into campaign tools, financed indirectly by taxpayers and orchestrated to reinforce the ruling party’s narrative. Every election cycle risks producing new “phantom media,” further eroding independent journalism. Without free, critical, and independent media, citizens cannot make informed choices, and elections cannot be truly free.
The Vučić regime’s approach illustrates a sophisticated media strategy: create a veneer of freedom through new outlets, while controlling their content, coordination, and funding to ensure that political narratives dominate. What appears as choice is in reality a tightly managed, top-down system of information control.
