The year 2024 was marked by significant elections—both in Europe and the United States—and ongoing tensions in the most fragile parts of the Western Balkans.
The EU enlargement process gained momentum in 2024, with the potential to stabilize the region. The key question for 2025 is whether this momentum can be maintained.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s second term has shown limited interest in the Western Balkans, raising doubts about the region’s prominence in U.S. foreign policy. However, the administration’s global influence may still indirectly impact the Balkans.
While early elections are a recurring theme in the region, only two regular elections are currently scheduled for 2025—Kosovo in February and Albania in May. In both cases, the incumbent leaders are favored to retain power.
Democracy in the Western Balkans continues to face long-standing challenges, with increasing citizen mobilization in protests, particularly in Serbia.
2025: A Decisive Year for EU Enlargement Momentum
In 2018, the European Commission under Jean-Claude Juncker set 2025 as a potential entry year for Serbia and Montenegro into the EU. Even then, this was seen as overly ambitious. Now, as 2025 arrives, no country is on the brink of EU membership.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders began prioritizing enlargement once again. Recent targets suggest Montenegro and Albania aim to close all negotiation chapters by 2026 and 2027, respectively. Serbia has also made formal progress in EU accession, but tangible results remain elusive.
The enlargement process has gained traction in recent months, with 2025 positioned as a pivotal year to sustain this progress. Montenegro plans to close additional chapters following its December achievements, and the EU Council has expressed readiness to initiate work on an accession treaty with the country “when appropriate.”
Poland’s EU Council Presidency, lasting until June 30, has committed to advancing enlargement. Meanwhile, the European Commission will conduct policy reviews in 2025 to determine necessary reforms for enlargement readiness.
Negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (2028–2034) will also begin formally, offering insights into whether the EU anticipates welcoming new members during this period.
How Will Trump’s Second Administration Approach the Region?
Since Donald Trump secured a second term as U.S. President, neither he nor his team has outlined plans for the Western Balkans, signaling a relatively low priority for the region in U.S. foreign policy.
During Trump’s first term, there were attempts to shift the course of certain issues, particularly Serbia-Kosovo relations, but overall continuity prevailed. Pre-election analyses suggested a Trump win would bolster conservative and nationalist forces in the Balkans while diminishing U.S. engagement in Europe, particularly in this region.
Trump’s new cabinet appointments, some aligned with assertive foreign policy stances, make the future approach to the Balkans uncertain.
Richard Grenell, familiar with the Balkans from his first-term role as Special Envoy for the Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue, has been reappointed as Special Envoy for Special Missions. Whether his focus will remain on the Balkans remains unclear. Serbian leaders, meanwhile, have invested in strong ties with Trump’s administration, including business deals involving Jared Kushner and Donald Trump Jr.
Kosovo-Serbia Relations: Continued Tensions or Progress Toward Normalization?
Barring major surprises in Kosovo’s upcoming elections, Albin Kurti and Aleksandar Vučić are expected to continue their roles in the normalization process, which saw little progress in 2024.
The Brussels-Ohrid Agreement of 2023, which aimed for “de facto” recognition between the two, remains part of their respective EU accession frameworks. However, implementation of the agreement has stalled.
Kurti’s actions in northern Kosovo, aimed at establishing full state control without forming the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, have strained relations with both the EU and the U.S. Serbia’s failure to prosecute Milan Radoičić, who claimed responsibility for the 2023 Banjska attack, remains another key issue.
The mandate of EU Special Envoy Miroslav Lajčak expires in January 2025, and new EU High Representative Kaja Kallas has yet to clarify whether she will appoint a new envoy or lead the process herself.
Regional Elections: Surprises or Continuity for Incumbents?
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for February 9 in Kosovo and May 11 in Albania. Incumbents Albin Kurti and Edi Rama are expected to retain power, maintaining their Euro-Atlantic integration agendas.
In Kosovo, Kurti’s Vetëvendosje party enjoys significant support, leading opposition parties by a wide margin. However, controversy arose when Kosovo’s Central Election Commission refused to certify the dominant Serb List party, leaving its participation uncertain pending appeals.
In Albania, Edi Rama’s Socialist Party seeks a fourth consecutive mandate. The main opposition Democratic Party, led by former Prime Minister Sali Berisha, has been weakened by internal conflicts and Berisha’s house arrest on corruption charges, which he denies.
Serbia: Will Protests Shake the Ruling Party?
While Serbia’s Progressive Party (SNS) appeared stable following local election wins in mid-2024, controversy over reviving a lithium mining project triggered massive protests. These protests intensified after the tragic collapse of Novi Sad’s newly reconstructed railway station in November.
Though early parliamentary elections are unlikely (regular elections are scheduled for 2027), street protests have grown, challenging the SNS. Serbia’s opposition remains fragmented, but public dissent shows no signs of waning.
– source: Telegrafi.
