On the global stage, Kosovo is still seeking to affirm its place. Even after nearly 18 years of independence, many Muslim-majority states — as well as others — have yet to recognize it, while its diplomacy often appears fragmented and unclear.
This year, President Vjosa Osmani, who holds responsibility for foreign policy, confirmed Kosovo’s recognition by three states: Kenya in March, Sudan in April, and Syria in October.
The last time Kosovo secured three recognitions in a single year was in 2015: from the Cook Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, and Niue. Throughout the past decade, until this year, the country received only six new recognitions.
The government of Albin Kurti, which led over the last four years, stated in its 2021–2025 governing program that “The Republic of Kosovo will strengthen its international subjectivity. This applies to efforts for recognition and reciprocal diplomatic relations, membership in international organizations, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, as well as the entire spectrum of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.”
Near the end of its mandate, in December 2024, Kurti attempted to deflect criticism regarding the lack of new recognitions, arguing that they were not part of his campaign promises.
“I know we have been criticized for not having new recognitions, but you must also understand something — neither visa liberalization nor new recognitions were promised during the campaign. In the campaign, we spoke about employment and justice. Therefore, you must measure us according to the commitments we made during the 2021 campaign and the government program thereafter,” Kurti said at the time.
Radio Free Europe requested information from the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora about their lobbying activities, priorities, and the possibility of new recognitions, but received no response.
The MFA website lists 120 countries that recognize Kosovo, but the number of Muslim-majority states remains relatively low. Considering that Kosovo itself is a predominantly Muslim-majority country, expectations would be for broader support from these states.
Still, its independence — declared in 2008 — has been recognized by only slightly more than half of the 57 member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Before this year’s recognitions from Sudan and Syria, the last Muslim-majority country to recognize Kosovo was Bangladesh in 2017.
Former Kosovo ambassador to Italy, Albert Prenkaj, says Kosovo’s strong identification as a U.S.-backed project — during a period when Washington has had strained relations with many Islamic countries — has often clashed with the regional interests of those states. According to him, the religious factor has carried little weight.
“Whenever we have presented the Islamic element, we have presented it as something unique, as a secular Islam — but Islamic states do not accept this, because they have a much deeper religious presence in society. In our case, it is not… and whenever we present ourselves this way, they do not see us as serious,” Prenkaj told Radio Free Europe’s Expose program.
Researcher Butrint Berisha, who completed his PhD in international relations at the University of Tartu in Estonia, says that history also plays an important role. According to him, Serbia inherited Yugoslavia’s extensive network with Arab, African, and Asian countries, which it continues to use today to obstruct Kosovo’s outreach to the Islamic world.
Furthermore, Belgrade has been engaged in a de-recognition campaign, which Serbian officials claim has produced results — though none have ever been confirmed by Kosovo authorities.
Berisha also notes that many states, beyond foreign influence, have their own internal sensitivities that make them cautious about recognizing Kosovo.
“Morocco and Western Sahara are the best example. On the ground, we are dealing with an occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco [though the UN considers it an unresolved issue]. Therefore, states that have issues with fully controlling their territory are more hesitant to recognize Kosovo. This applies not only to Islamic countries but globally,” Berisha told Expose.
Kosovo’s recognition by Syria came after a regime change and increased U.S. influence in the region.
Both experts emphasize that Kosovo must capitalize on these global shifts to advance its interests. They suggest Lebanon as the next potentially favorable Muslim-majority country for lobbying, now that it has a functioning government and is increasingly within U.S. strategic focus. Additionally, Azerbaijan — following the U.S.-mediated agreement with Armenia — is seen as a realistic target for new recognition.
Radio Free Europe emailed the foreign ministries of both countries to ask whether they are considering recognizing Kosovo, but received no response.
Former diplomat Prenkaj says that Kosovo, particularly in recent years, has not followed a stable strategy to present itself as a credible international actor. The lack of coordination between the Presidency, the Government, and the MFA, as well as with key allies — the U.S., the U.K., and Turkey — has weakened its recognition campaign, he argues.
“It is ad hoc policy. I have said before that Kosovo, for some time now, has had no foreign policy, because coordination with friendly states has been lost,” he says.
In 2008, when Kosovo declared independence, then–Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi promised recognition from 193 states — meaning all UN member states plus one more. However, Kosovo remains far from this objective.
The country is not recognized even by two Western Balkan states — Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina — as well as five EU member states: Greece, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus.
Institutionally, Kosovo has managed to join organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD, and others, but has failed to enter UNESCO, Interpol, the Council of Europe, the UN, and others.
Experts agree that Kosovo must build a multi-layered and consistent strategy for international recognition. Beyond traditional diplomacy, Berisha recommends leveraging economic partnerships and non-state actors like NGOs and celebrities.
“I maintain that there is significant space in non-Western states for Kosovo — even when recognition is not possible — to deepen economic relations. Naturally with the Islamic world, but also with states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The more partnerships there are, the more opportunities for people and businesses,” Berisha says.
Both Prenkaj and Berisha emphasize that new recognitions remain essential for Kosovo, as they demonstrate the state’s durability and its role as a stabilizing factor in the region.
Berisha notes that the debate between foreign and domestic policy is inevitable, but to illustrate the weight recognitions carry, he offers the example of the Palestinian territories, recognized by more states than Kosovo, yet still unstable due to their conflict with Israel. Even in such cases, the number of recognitions maintains symbolic and diplomatic value, regardless of complex realities on the ground.
In this context, Berisha recalls that Kosovo’s entire state-building process has historically been constructed around the quest for international recognition.
“I believe that the Kosovo state project — not only the independence declared in February 2008, but since the 1990s — has been based on international recognition. So Kosovo has sought this for decades, and there is no reason to change this approach,” he says.
In a world where alliances shift rapidly and diplomatic competition intensifies, experts emphasize that Kosovo’s new government must establish a coordinated strategy with allies, while also having the flexibility to act quickly whenever new opportunities arise — as was the case with Syria after the regime change. In diplomacy, timing is as important as vision.
