The wave of protests in Serbia is still an unknown, as is whether President Aleksandar Vučić will attempt to escape into new elections. What is certain is that Serbia faces another turbulent year ahead.
Politicians who toppled Slobodan Milošević in 2000 promised Serbia a well-organized, essentially uneventful country. However, the past year has been yet another marked by political turmoil.
In 2024, many things have worsened compared to the period of democratic change in October 2000, as parliamentary democracy in Serbia has practically been dismantled, and the country finds itself on the brink of a one-party system.
The inability to accomplish anything within the institutions after the tragedy in Novi Sad led to mass student protests, primarily demanding that the activities of President Aleksandar Vučić return to constitutional boundaries and that the institutions begin functioning properly.
Any opposition activity, activism, or critical stance towards the government is seen as illegal and extremist.
In 2024, Serbia got a new government on April 30, the largest since 2000. The government was formed after December 2023 elections, which were marred by numerous irregularities. Local elections were also held, in which the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) won the majority.
The past year also saw the dramatic dissolution of the remaining Serbian institutions in Kosovo, the removal of the dinar as the official currency, and Belgrade now only controlling education and healthcare.
After the destruction of a canopy in Novi Sad, the government attempted through various maneuvers to avoid responsibility, but despite this, student unrest marked the end of the year, and protests are expected to continue as a hot topic in 2025.
Protest Depends on General Mobilization
The extent of the student rebellion in 2025 and its success largely depends on whether other segments of society join the movement, according to political analyst Đorđe Vukadinović.
“The mere outbreak of protests is somewhat of a sensation, but whether they will survive is a big dilemma. Protests will definitely spill over into 2025, and support for these protests must spread and evolve into a social movement, or they will begin to wither,” he says.
“The key thing is not whether the students can hold on, but whether other social groups, organizations, and individuals will step forward and actively join the movement,” adds Vukadinović.
Massive Protest at Slavija
The development of the protests has exceeded expectations, says Dušan Spasojević from the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade.
“There may be little chance for a general strike or an interim government, but we are in a great zone of uncertainty. This means that everything that seemed impossible a few weeks ago is no longer certain, but it is still possible,” says Spasojević.
As for the situation in higher education, he notes that options are being considered for professors to join the students, which is happening in some other areas. This suggests the situation is heading towards a general strike.
Government Cautious About Elections
An option for the government to exit the crisis could be early elections, but for now, that variant is not on the table. The leadership is avoiding such announcements, except for one unsuccessful attempt by Vučić to threaten resignation because he’s “had enough.”
Đorđe Vukadinović believes that the option of elections cannot be ruled out. “I think the regime is considering it, but the situation is different now compared to past cases when elections were called. They would likely do so if they were sure the opposition would participate. Right now, it’s uncertain, and that’s why they’re not publicly offering elections,” he says.
Looking from the government’s perspective, elections would be the cheapest possible outcome, notes Dušan Spasojević.
“Calling elections would shift the ball to the opposition’s court, which is divided and would likely argue over it. The problem is that it’s still a risky situation for the government. Elections could be called, and the crisis could just deepen,” says Spasojević.
“In this scenario, we can imagine what was previously unimaginable—that SNS loses the elections or that their majority is drastically reduced. The decision will likely depend on how the protests develop,” he concludes.
Cluster 3 – Reward for the Breakdown of Democracy?
When things get difficult for Vučić, the European Union steps in. Or at least that’s the impression in Serbia after frequent announcements that Serbia could open Cluster 3 in EU negotiations in January or February, which the opposition sees as a reward for the undemocratic regime.
The regime has invested considerable energy in promoting the largely forgotten European integration process, because, as Đorđe Vukadinović says, “it’s a topic that neither the government nor the opposition is really interested in.”
“This is now a sidelined issue, which Vučić is aggressively promoting in an attempt to dull the sharpness of the protests. I think he’s doing it more for external actors, to please authorities in Western capitals, than because he is truly committed to the European path,” says Vukadinović.
Vučić Promises Lithium to Germany
The government has made some concessions to secure Cluster 3, notes Dušan Spasojević, adding, “This was supposed to signal that European integration is still ongoing.”
“At this point, the government really can’t offer many concessions because it would be seen as a sign of weakness, so the opening of that cluster will depend on the assessment of individual European countries. A formal break in European integration could shake the government and worry some economic circles,” says Spasojević.
The Swelling Bubble of Trumpmania
At the beginning of the year, the new U.S. administration will take center stage. Donald Trump’s victory was somewhat euphorically received in regime circles, as they assess that it will mean a much better position for Serbia, particularly regarding Kosovo.
That enthusiasm is somewhat based on business arrangements that members of Trump’s inner circle have made in Belgrade.
Dušan Spasojević assesses that “the new U.S. administration could mean more investments and development opportunities, but it could also mean that not much attention will be paid to issues like democracy and human rights. The Serbian government can’t expect any special concessions regarding Kosovo or European integration.”
Serbia’s Withdrawal from Kosovo
In 2024, Serbia’s presence in Kosovo was increasingly diminished. Based on events at the end of the year, when more Serbian institutions were dismantled, it seems that this trend will continue into 2025.
“The fact that Serbia’s presence in Kosovo is diminishing, without much public reaction, shows that the significance of this issue has decreased,” says Dušan Spasojević.
Vučić has already tried several times to divert attention from protests to Kosovo, and it hasn’t worked. “I think this trend will continue, but I don’t expect any dramatic changes or solutions,” says Spasojević.
Kosovo’s Declining Importance in Belgrade
Serbia’s presence in Kosovo is steadily diminishing—this is a constant of the ruling Progressive Party, points out Đorđe Vukadinović.
“Cynics would say this was the reason Vučić came to power. I think Serbia’s withdrawal from Kosovo will continue,” he says, concluding:
“Maybe the Trump administration will offer a slightly fairer agreement, but it’s questionable what would actually constitute a fair offer for the Serbian side. It’s only possible that there will be fewer provocations like the ones Kurti has carried out over the last few years,” Vukadinović concludes for DW.
