Russian aggression is multi-dimensional and spans across various fields, and Aleksandar Vulin could potentially be Russia’s greatest intelligence asset. This is what Taras Mokliak, an observer for Guildhall News Agency, states, adding that Serbia uses similar models to Russia to conduct hybrid operations.
According to Mokliak, Serbia’s hybrid war includes strong ties between Serbian political parties and the Russian embassy, as well as extremist organizations and football ultras who support Russian narratives, particularly those against the EU’s efforts to resolve the Kosovo situation.
“A significant part of Serbia’s opposition parties has strong ties with the Russian embassy,” he says.
According to him, the extremist groups of Partizan and Crvena Zvezda football clubs have direct links with Russian intelligence services and are involved in attempts to destabilize the region, advocating for the return of Kosovo to Serbia.
Full Interview:
Mokliak: “First of all, I want to say that disinformation is just one tool being used by the Russians in their hybrid aggression, both against Ukraine and the West. The nature of this hybrid war is that its multi-dimensional aggression is carried out with non-military tools, which is why we call it hybrid aggression. The second aspect of this hybrid war is that it affects all fields of public life, both in Ukraine and the West. Again, this involves politics, civil society, the cultural sphere, the church, of course, religion, sports – everything that the Russians can use to influence in a hybrid manner in Ukraine or against our Western partners, including Kosovo, they are using. And of course, media and disinformation are one of the key tools the Russians are using.”
Regarding the ongoing disinformation narratives and operations, for example in Ukraine, Mokliak points out a particular one that plays an important role. The narrative suggests that the West has betrayed Ukraine. This narrative includes many messages, functioning in the same way as Russian propaganda. They have a main narrative, and then a box of messages that supports it.
He mentions that “the main message is that the West has betrayed Ukraine,” which they use to create a sense of mistrust in Western support, particularly the lack of weapons deliveries, the unwillingness of NATO to invite Ukraine, the indecision of European and American partners in securing Ukraine’s safety, guarantees, or even permission to use Western arms on Russian territory. All these messages support the narrative that the West has betrayed Ukraine. This is one of the most massive disinformation operations currently being carried out in Ukrainian society.
Mokliak also critiques the current approach to countering disinformation, which he believes focuses too much on the message or narrative itself, which he sees as a tool of the disinformation operation. Instead, he emphasizes the need to focus on the final goal of these operations—pushing Ukraine into negotiations on Russian terms, ultimately accepting the conditions for ending the conflict as proposed by Russia.
Serbia’s Propaganda and Disinformation Operations in the Balkans:
Mokliak explains that the key feature of any hybrid operation is infrastructure. As the Russians call it, “positions.” The Russians have built an extensive infrastructure for conducting hybrid operations in Serbia. This includes political parties, civil society representatives, football ultras, and others. A significant portion of Serbian opposition parties has strong ties with the Russian embassy. Some of these parties even have agreements with Putin’s party, United Russia.
When it comes to right-wing extremist groups such as “Serbska Akcija” or “Club 451,” they have very strong connections with Russian military intelligence, and some even have smaller partners in Serbia. Mokliak points out that various organizations within civil society also have these ties. As for Kosovo, these groups, including the ones mentioned, oppose the EU’s initiative to resolve the Kosovo situation. A recent example of this opposition is the Serbian football ultras from Partizan and Crvena Zvezda. Both groups have ties to Russia, with Partizan’s ultras having links to the Russian GRU unit 29155. These ultras were involved in an attempt to destabilize Moldova, where they were blocked by Moldovan law enforcement forces. They were discovered to be part of a Russian intelligence operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova.
Crvena Zvezda ultras also have close ties with Spartak Moscow ultras, who are under the control of Russian intelligence services. Both these football fan groups are heavily involved in the narrative that “Kosovo is Serbia.” They demand the return of Kosovo and Metohija to Serbia, often using radical narratives, including the potential use of force to resolve the Kosovo issue.
Mokliak believes that the goal of this narrative is to undermine the EU’s process for resolving the Kosovo situation and provoke bilateral tensions between Kosovo and Serbia. If the Russians are successful, they would provoke further destabilization in the region. He highlights that the West’s stance toward Kosovo is often more firm than toward Ukraine.
Vulin’s Role and Russia’s Influence:
Regarding Vulin, Mokliak argues that despite his claims of being an independent Serbian politician, his numerous ties to the Kremlin prevent any claims of free speech or neutrality. Mokliak uses a specific methodology to track such individuals, enabling them to assess the risk of someone being a potential Russian intelligence asset. According to this methodology, Vulin’s risk level as a potential Russian intelligence asset is very high. This is supported by his actions, such as during recent environmental protests, when Vulin blamed the West, particularly the EU, attempting to provoke revolution and destabilization in Serbia.
Message to Balkan Civil Society and Journalists:
Mokliak urges Balkan civil society to understand the nature of Russia’s hybrid warfare and the aggressive tactics of its intelligence services. While Russian intelligence may not be as effective in conventional warfare, it is highly efficient in unconventional and hybrid activities. He advises the region to study Soviet intelligence methods and apply them to understand and counter Russian subversive activities. By recognizing the methodology behind Russia’s hybrid tactics, the Balkan states can develop their strategies to counter Russia’s influence and defend their way of life.
Finally, Mokliak stresses that the focus should not be on the tools, such as the narrative or disinformation itself, but on the ultimate goal of these operations. Only by understanding the end goals can the region effectively fight back against Russian subversion.
