Eighteen months without a high-level meeting—dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has stalled. With both countries facing internal challenges, a final agreement seems distant. Analysts argue that the international community should push for mutual recognition rather than merely normalizing relations and should have a Plan B if dialogue fails.
Peter Sorensen’s first visit to Pristina as the European Union’s envoy for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue comes at a time when the process seems to be off the agenda.
In Kosovo, attention remains on post-election issues, while Serbia is dealing with protests and internal unrest.
Despite this, Sorensen’s message was clear: dialogue must continue.
“Dialogue is about ensuring meetings take place. Whether that means compromise or not is up to the parties to decide. This is what we have been doing since 2011,” Sorensen said on March 17 in Pristina.
Fourteen years ago, EU-mediated talks between Kosovo and Serbia began. Over the years, negotiations have fluctuated in intensity, resulting in numerous agreements, many of which remain unimplemented.
Leaders have changed in Brussels, Pristina, and Belgrade, as has the narrative. While mutual recognition was once a primary objective, discussions now focus only on normalizing relations.
After meeting with Kosovo’s leadership, Sorensen emphasized the need to continue dialogue but stated he wanted to hear both sides before determining the next steps.
“The goal is to keep the process moving forward. I have discussions here in Pristina, but I also need to go to Belgrade. Once I have these conversations, I will assess where we stand,” Sorensen said.
Stalemate in High-Level Talks
The two sides remain far apart. The last high-level talks occurred in September 2023, when Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, and Serbia’s President, Aleksandar Vučić, met in Brussels under the mediation of Josep Borrell and Miroslav Lajčák.
Ten days later, a deadly attack took place in Banjska, where armed Serbian groups killed a Kosovo police officer.
Subsequent EU attempts to bring the two leaders back to the negotiating table have failed—mainly due to conditions set by one side that the other refuses to accept.
Following their meeting with Sorensen, both Kurti and Kosovo’s President Vjosa Osmani made demands: lifting EU sanctions against Kosovo and extraditing those responsible for the Banjska attack to Kosovan authorities.
Observers argue that the ball is now in the EU’s court. They believe it is time for the bloc to focus on a clear goal—mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia—as the core of the issue that must be addressed directly.
Leon Hartwell, a senior fellow at LSE IDEAS, spoke to Radio Free Europe’s Exposé program:
“It’s crucial to put mutual recognition at the forefront of this dialogue because the idea of normalization is too vague. Without a clear objective, there is no real effort to achieve something specific.”
“Therefore, I believe Sorensen should set this as the primary goal to push the parties in a clear direction and resolve this conflict once and for all,” Hartwell said.
Serbia’s Resistance and the Issue of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities
Vučić insists that Serbia will never recognize Kosovo’s independence. His primary focus remains on establishing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities in Kosovo—a demand he often sets as a condition for continuing dialogue.
An agreement on the association was reached in 2013, but Kosovo has never implemented it, fearing that such a mechanism, with extensive powers, could undermine the country’s functionality.
Kosovo has received an EU-drafted statute for the association, but it appears to be off the table for now.
President Osmani stated this week that the draft, in its current form, would not pass constitutional review in Kosovo.
“I personally believe it is not in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, nor with EU values and Council of Europe standards, nor with the 2015 ruling of the Constitutional Court,” Osmani said.
A powerful association could risk creating a Republika Srpska in Kosovo, Hartwell warned, referring to the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which holds legislative power.
“There’s a strong perception that the association would advance the dialogue, but I’m very skeptical. One option for Kosovo could be to introduce a softened version and implement it in a way that silences critics.”
“But granting it strong executive powers would become highly problematic for Kosovo,” Hartwell added.
The EU’s Role and the Need for a Plan B
Kurt Bassuener of the Democratization Policy Council in Berlin argues that Bosnia and Herzegovina remains an unresolved issue due to its internal structure, and he does not rule out the possibility that the Kosovo-Serbia dispute could become similarly protracted.
He suggests that all parties return to the original goal of mutual recognition.
“No one talks about mutual recognition anymore. Everyone speaks of normalization, which is not in Kosovo’s interest, and I would argue that it’s not in the interest of a democratic Serbia either,” Bassuener said.
In the wake of shifting geopolitical dynamics, Bassuener believes the Western Balkans remain a region where the EU has significant potential to stabilize the situation. The Kosovo-Serbia issue, he argues, is central to this stability.
“I hope for a reassessment and reorganization of EU policies. So far, I see no evidence of this—neither in EU institutions nor among member states—even though it takes time to shift strategies.”
“The EU is understandably focused on helping Ukraine, securing itself if the U.S. withdraws, and defending its legitimate interests. These are priorities, but the Western Balkans is the one place where the EU can truly be decisive,” Bassuener told Exposé.
Analysts believe the EU still holds leverage over Kosovo and Serbia to push them toward an agreement, even though conditioning their EU accession on normalization has yielded little progress.
Hartwell argues that the West must have a clear Plan B if the dialogue collapses.
“One possible solution is for the five EU states that have not yet recognized Kosovo to do so. That would take Serbia’s argument off the table—that Kosovo’s recognition is still in limbo. If Serbia truly wants EU membership, it would have to operate within this new reality,” Hartwell said.
However, some speculate that Serbia sees more room for maneuver with Donald Trump potentially returning to the White House due to its close ties—both politically and economically—with Trump’s allies.
Thus, analysts suggest Kosovo should focus on maintaining bipartisan support in Washington.
According to Hartwell, Kosovo should position itself as a reliable partner, particularly in security and economic matters, while enhancing cooperation with the U.S. in energy and defense.
In recent years, Kosovo’s government, led by Albin Kurti, has faced periodic criticism from U.S. officials over actions in the Serb-majority north, which were deemed uncoordinated and damaging to the local Serb community.
Kosovo’s last known contact with the White House was a letter from Trump to President Osmani in February, marking Kosovo’s 17th independence anniversary.
In the letter, Trump pledged to strengthen ties with Kosovo but made no mention of the dialogue with Serbia.
The EU has not responded to Radio Free Europe’s inquiry on whether it plans to convene a meeting between the two countries’ leaders soon. It also remains unclear whether they would accept such an invitation.
With Kosovo still without a new government following February elections and ongoing protests in Serbia, the only thing moving forward with certainty is the calendar.
