For Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, truly competitive elections represent an unacceptable risk to his regime and its network of political and business-criminal interests. That is why, on March 29, all available “artillery” had to be deployed—though it no longer carries the same effectiveness. The paradox is that the government itself generates conditions that could lead to societal implosion without a strong, clearly articulated resistance.
Looking back at 2021, the “Dialogue with Youth” event at the Science and Technology Park in Niš illustrates the disconnect between leadership and citizens. Organized by the National Youth Organization, the event featured then-Prime Minister Ana Brnabić and Minister for Labor, Employment, and Veterans’ Affairs Darija Kisić Tepavčević.
Nemanja Obradović, a young man from Temerin, addressed the Prime Minister directly, raising concerns about the lack of potable water in his hometown for 18 years. He stressed that while Serbia is his home, basic infrastructure like drinking water should be a priority over other expenditures, such as sports league broadcasts. His plea highlighted the challenges faced by local communities and the disconnect between government priorities and citizens’ needs.
Brnabić responded by emphasizing the autonomy of entities like Telekom, but the exchange exemplifies the government’s limited engagement with grassroots concerns.
On March 29, local elections were held in nine municipalities and one city. In a normal context, these elections would focus on local issues, candidate programs, and improving community standards of living. In today’s Serbia, however, the elections resembled a battlefield rather than a democratic process.
The regime launched an aggressive pre-election campaign through state-aligned and tabloid media, targeting opponents as enemies. President Vučić even compared student activists to Taliban fighters and associated them with the Pol Pot regime, creating a climate of fear and intimidation.
A campaign video further reinforced a narrative of national suffering followed by resilience and prosperity, portraying Vučić as the indispensable, visionary leader protecting the nation. This messaging extended to national security, with demonstrations of military hardware, including MiG jets and CM-400 missiles from China, framed as defense while simultaneously portraying neighboring countries as potential threats.
Election-day tactics included coercion, material incentives, intimidation, and manipulation of electoral processes. Vehicles with fake or out-of-town license plates followed activists, students faced physical threats, journalists’ cars were vandalized, and electoral lists were allegedly misused. The strategy reflects the regime’s insatiable desire to display power, unconstrained by the social or moral cost.
Despite winning the local elections, the results show declining support for the SNS compared to previous cycles. The regime maintains a disproportionate advantage in resources and influence over opposition and civil society actors, underscoring the structural imbalance between state power and civic resistance.
Vučić’s leadership relies on cultivating a cult of personality and controlling dissent, but the foundation of unconditional support is eroding. The regime paradoxically creates conditions for societal tension that could ultimately destabilize the state. Resistance requires organization, awareness, and a deliberate strategy to counter the government’s entrenched power structures.
The fate of young citizens like Nemanja Obradović, who confront systemic neglect in their hometowns, serves as a litmus test for the country’s ability to nurture and retain future generations. Their voices remain critical to assessing whether Serbia’s civil society can effectively challenge entrenched authority.
