Serbia appears to be entering a new phase of espionage operations against Kosovo, with a dual focus on enhancing technological capabilities and strengthening operational infrastructure, including the infiltration of spies. This escalation comes at a time when Kosovo’s security institutions, particularly the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (AKI), have successfully disrupted several Serbian networks operating within Kosovo.
Official draft budget documents reveal that for 2026, Serbia’s BIA (Security Information Agency) will have nearly €89 million (10.4 billion dinars), marking the largest increase in recent years and a sharp rise compared to the 2024 and 2025 budgets.
This budget increase coincides with a noticeable rise in espionage arrests in Kosovo over the past three years. Some were accused of collecting sensitive information from Kosovo’s security institutions, while others were part of wider espionage networks.
A significant portion of BIA’s budget is classified as “Confidential National Security Programs”, meaning these allocations are opaque, unaccountable, and not subject to public scrutiny. Actual spending on espionage against Kosovo may therefore be even higher than reported.
Weaknesses Undermine Serbia’s Espionage Effectiveness
Despite the increased funding, the BIA faces internal problems, including corruption, misuse of resources, and a weakened operational network. Some BIA structures are reportedly engaged in domestic political affairs, such as monitoring protesters, diverting attention from external intelligence operations. As a result, the budget increase appears more symbolic than a genuine enhancement of capability.
In contrast, Kosovo’s AKI, in cooperation with the police and prosecution, has carried out highly effective operations, arresting espionage suspects and neutralizing infiltration attempts. Even Bojan Dimić, the Serbian official often cited as responsible for Kosovo-related operations, has largely failed on the ground due to the professionalism of Kosovo’s institutions. The balance of security in Kosovo is therefore unlikely to be affected by Serbia’s budget increase.
This year, Kosovo also sentenced Aleksandar Vlajić, marking the first espionage conviction since independence. Four other indictments have been filed, with additional cases ongoing.
Use of Surveillance Against Domestic Opponents
A large part of the expanded BIA budget is reportedly allocated to advanced surveillance equipment, communication tracking technologies, and data analytics platforms. Serbian media indicate these tools are often used internally to monitor judges, prosecutors, and critics of President Aleksandar Vučić’s regime.
Civil society organizations and activists have reported illegal wiretaps, account intrusions, and monitoring during major protests against Vučić. Some of these operations were allegedly financed through the BIA budget between 2019–2021. Tools imported included mass communication monitoring systems and spyware, such as the Israeli “Cellebrite” and the “NoviSpy” platform, allowing remote access to phones, cameras, and microphones, targeting journalists and activists critical of Vučić.
Collaboration with Russian and Chinese Intelligence
Reports suggest that BIA has maintained close operational ties with Russian and Chinese intelligence services, mirroring the surveillance tactics used in those countries. Initiatives reportedly include joint task forces modeled after Russian “color revolution” suppression strategies, urban monitoring technology agreements with China, and technology transfers for domestic control purposes.
Analysts warn that Serbia’s strategic alignment with Russia and China, coupled with the expanded BIA budget, could have broader negative implications for regional security. This occurs despite repeated calls from the European Union for Serbia to distance itself from Russian and Chinese influence and align its security policies with European standards.
The increase in Serbia’s intelligence budget, while significant on paper, reflects Vučić’s prioritization of authoritarian control over genuine security effectiveness. Internally, these funds are used to monitor critics and suppress dissent, while external operations, such as espionage against Kosovo, are plagued by inefficiency and failures. This pattern demonstrates that Vučić’s security apparatus serves political survival and patronage rather than real national or regional security interests.
