Serbian political scientist and journalist of Ukrainian descent, Boris Varga, in an interview with UNIAN, discussed the relations between Serbia and Ukraine, the attitude of the citizens of this Balkan country towards the war unleashed by Russia, and why the majority there supports Russian narratives so fervently.
Serbia is one of the influential countries in the Balkans and has been a candidate for European Union membership since 2012. Despite declaring European aspirations, the country often aligns with Russian politics. In particular, pro-Russian sentiments are widespread in Serbian society, resulting from both Russian and domestic propaganda, especially in regards to the war in Ukraine.
Mr. Boris, how would you describe the current Ukrainian-Serbian relations?
On the international and diplomatic levels, relations between Serbia and Ukraine seem friendly. Formally, both countries respect and support each other’s territorial integrity. Specifically, Ukraine has not yet recognized Kosovo as a state, and Serbia officially recognizes Crimea as part of Ukraine. During UN voting, Serbia supported nearly all resolutions condemning Russian aggression. Belgrade was only reserved in one case – concerning reparations, considering its circumstances related to the Balkan Wars in the 1990s.
Serbia sends humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and Ukrainian refugees are present within its territory. Additionally, it has even supplied ammunition to Ukraine. This is the official picture, and it all seems as though Serbia is friendly towards Ukraine. However, this more closely resembles its desire not to spoil its reputation in the West and to be on Ukraine’s side on issues relevant to its interests.
On one hand, Serbia seems to condemn the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but on the other, it is the only country in Europe that has not imposed sanctions against Russia.
Yes, this is another facet of Ukrainian-Serbian relations. Serbia did not join the Crimean Platform, and most importantly – Belgrade did not impose sanctions against the Russian Federation, as demanded by the EU and keenly anticipated by Kyiv. This is not only a problem between Ukraine and Serbia but also of a common policy against Russia, because Belgrade is a strategic partner of Russia and practices a policy of sitting on two chairs.
There is also a third aspect. Analyzing Serbian media aimed at the domestic audience, Serbia appears as the most loyal partner to Russia, akin to a pro-Putin governorate, the “Trojan horse” of Russia in the Balkans, and the most pro-Russian candidate to the EU. This poses a threat to the European future.
President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić (who has held office since 2017 and was twice Prime Minister before that, thus shaping the nation’s internal and external agenda for over a decade, – UNIAN) once stated that Ukraine had done nothing wrong to Serbia. However, he continues to maintain ties with Russia and has no intention of severing them. He understands the importance for the Russian Federation of not imposing sanctions.
Pro-Russian sentiments in Serbia are visible even in souvenir products featuring the letter Z, in portraits of Vladimir Putin on the streets of Belgrade and other cities, and in the presence of Russian flags. This may indicate a coordinated campaign, but overall, the mood within Serbian society has remained very pro-Russian.
What causes this?
Primarily, it’s due to Russian information influence in the Balkans, ongoing since 2014. This involves the revival of the “Greater Serbian idea,” now referred to as the “Serbian world,” akin to the “Russian world.”
Overall, Serbia and the Serbian people hold no grudge against Ukraine. However, the pro-Russian support primarily reflects anti-Western sentiments, a direct consequence of Serbia’s defeat in the Balkan Wars of the 90s. When it seemed that the “Greater Serbian idea” had been defeated because it was time for reconciliation and lasting peace, in 2022, these sentiments intensified with revanchist attitudes significantly rising within Serbian society.
The “Serbian world,” or as newly termed the “Serbo-Russian world,” refers to territories inhabited by ethnic Serbs: Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Northern Kosovo, and, of course, Serbia. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine prompted right-wing politicians to the idea of a grand unification of territories inhabited by Serbs and the creation of Greater Serbia. This idea was also voiced by some ministers in the Serbian government. While it may not officially be policy, on the other hand, if ministers talk about the Serbo-Russian world, about unifying these territories, ties with Russia, then it can’t be dismissed as not part of Belgrade’s official policy.
This policy was notably vocalized by Aleksandar Vulin, who held key positions in the security and defense sector. At one time, he was the Minister of Internal Affairs, then the Minister of Defense, and managed intelligence. Last November, Vulin resigned from his position as the head of the Security and Intelligence Agency of Serbia, supposedly under pressure from the West. But in Russia, at the beginning of this year, he received two orders…
If these statements were only in the media or from parliamentary radical forces, they could be seen as a manifestation of democracy because everyone can have different opinions. In a democratic society, radical elements also have a place. However, when a representative of the government’s power bloc says this, it’s a significant problem.
It is known that Serbian citizens are fighting against Ukraine. And presumably, not just financial incentives matter, but ideology too?
Yes, Serbian volunteers have been going to fight in Ukraine on Russia’s side since 2014. Although Serbian law considers participation in military actions on the territory of other states a criminal offense. Thus, one problem, I believe, is that the first volunteers received very lenient punishments: they were put under house arrest or received suspended sentences. This did not act as a deterrent.
There’s a part of the volunteers who, of course, fight for money. But there’s also a significant part of those – confirmed by surveys – who believe that Russia is right in this conflict, that in Ukraine, it is fighting NATO, and Ukrainians don’t fight at all. These people think that Russia is defending its territories and zone of interest.
How prevalent is Russian propaganda in Serbia? How are its narratives perceived in society?
Here, broadcasting continues for “Russia Today” and “Sputnik,” banned in Europe, as Serbia has not applied sanctions against Russia. Both channels are broadcast in Serbian.
However, it’s worth noting that Aleksandar Vučić’s regime produces pro-Russian propaganda in its controlled media for its political needs. The ruling Serbian Progressive Party was formed from former Serbian radicals. These are the people who incited conflicts with Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia in the 90s. Their leader, Vojislav Šešelj, was convicted by the international tribunal in The Hague as a war criminal. Today, the Serbian Progressive Party has the support of over 40% of citizens; it is inherently pro-Russian and anti-Western.
To sway the electorate from other parties, Aleksandar Vučić plays with potential voters. He tells one part of the electorate – “yes, we are going to the EU,” and to another, through pro-Russian journalists – “yes, we are going to Russia.” Serbia is the only country where, in February 2022, ahead of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, printed publications published headlines on the front pages stating, “Ukraine attacked Russia.”
I believe that Putin in Serbia is the most popular foreign politician. The latest surveys show that more and more Serbs do not support European integration. Instead, there are desires for integration into the Eurasian Union, BRICS (an international organization of the largest developing countries, among whose founders are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, – UNIAN). And these trends should be understood as President Vučić’s personal game. Thanks to the loyalty of the authorities, there are many Russian citizens in Serbia, and through Belgrade, they enter Western European countries.
Explaining the dual position of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić requires understanding his strategic navigation between East and West, similar to Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Vučić has crafted his “own path,” leveraging propaganda and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine to pursue a policy beneficial to him while the West, unable to exert additional pressure in the Balkans, currently tolerates Belgrade’s behavior.
On the international stage, Vučić presents himself as pro-European. Yet, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has prompted Serbia to focus on its internal interests, seeking dominance in the Western Balkans region where there is a significant Serbian ethnic population.
However, Serbia’s “sitting on two chairs” approach may not be sustainable indefinitely. The question arises: Will Serbia join the EU, or will it remain isolated? Potential risks include isolation, sanctions, and financial restrictions. Serbia, being one of the poorer countries in Europe, heavily relies on the EU, as two-thirds of its external economic relations are with European countries. Severing these ties would be akin to “cutting off the branch we’re sitting on.” An alignment with the Eurasian Union or BRICS might mirror Albania’s Cold War-era isolation, requiring extensive reforms to catch up.
The support for Serbia’s EU membership has declined during the Ukraine war, as evidenced by public opinion polls, with only about 40% of the population supporting a European orientation. This is the result of pro-Russian and Serbian nationalist propaganda, coupled with a sense of revanchism. Nearly every Serbian family has members who have fought or been displaced, yet Serbia has not fully reconciled with its past, including acknowledging war crimes.
Yet, over 50% of Serbian citizens favoring alignment with the Eurasian Union raises questions about their genuine preferences, given their Western preferences for vacations, education, and cars. This illustrates the complexity of Serbia’s “sitting on two chairs.”
The allure of friendship with Russia for Serbs is somewhat mythical, given Serbia’s historical autonomy from Soviet influence. After World War II, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito effectively expelled the Red Army, and former Yugoslavia was almost an associate member of NATO, protected from the USSR. Today’s pro-Russian sentiment among Serbs, despite little familiarity with Russian language, culture, or economy, and without living alongside Russians, suggests a romanticized view of Russia as an imagined “wonder.”
Whether European aspirations can prevail under such circumstances remains to be seen. Vučić’s propaganda and nationalist narrative for the “Serbian world,” while simultaneously pursuing a pro-European policy to retain Western investors, reflects his balancing act. However, Serbia’s status as a “permanent candidate” to the EU seems to suit Vučić, who, like Orbán and Erdogan, sees benefits in not fully committing to either side. This strategic ambiguity allows Serbia to navigate its geopolitical interests, keeping the option of European integration open while maintaining ties with Russia.
Even in Serbian schools, there’s a noted negative attitude towards some Ukrainian peers. A personal experience shared involved a family’s son encountering a portrait of Putin in a Serbian state school’s office, raising questions about its presence instead of a Serbian educational figure, after whom the school was named. This incident, among others, illustrates the pro-Russian sentiment that can pervade even educational environments in Serbia.
The family also faced direct threats and intimidation for condemning Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, highlighting the challenges faced by those opposing pro-Russian narratives in Serbia. This atmosphere likely contributes to why Ukrainian refugees tend to bypass Serbia or stay only briefly.
Regarding Kosovo, there’s a quiet understanding and mutual support between Ukraine and Kosovo due to their similar situations and shared threats from the “Serbian-Russian world.” However, Kyiv currently cannot recognize Kosovo’s independence without raising questions from other countries, especially from the Global South. Western partners understand this and do not demand such recognition from Ukraine, viewing it as a tactical move rather than a long-term strategy.
Belgrade understands that Ukraine’s recognition of Kosovo could signal other states to follow suit. Moscow’s statements regarding Kosovo attempt to draw parallels with Crimea to justify its actions, even though these cases are fundamentally different. The only similarity lies in Serbia’s and Russia’s methods of ethnic cleansing in the late 1990s and in Ukraine, respectively.
Currently, cooperation between Ukraine and Kosovo is much lower than between Moscow and Pristina, with Russia having an office in Kosovo while Ukraine does not.
As for Serbia’s reconciliation with Kosovo, the Serbian information space largely ignores the crimes of the 1990s. Attempts to address these issues, whether through film or literature, often face censorship or rejection, indicating significant obstacles to acknowledging past wrongs. This resistance complicates the prospect of Serbia recognizing Kosovo and achieving a genuine understanding between the two.
At the same time, Western countries need to clearly explain why they recognized Kosovo – because Serbia could not take care of its citizens of Albanian descent. In the 1990s, there was a form of Serbian apartheid in the region – Albanian schools were eliminated, Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked, and over 1.5 million Albanians couldn’t use their native language. It was a terrible situation where the Albanian language was forced underground – children were educated in apartments, in the private houses of teachers. This is known to independent journalists, but ordinary Serbian citizens are not aware of this.
Serbia does not want to recognize the crimes of the 1990s, to explain why the war with NATO happened, which was a certain punishment and prevention of further conflict development.
Moreover, in the last 30 years since the introduction of a multi-party system in the country, Serbian nationalism has been the dominant ideology. It recognizes nothing but Serbian ethnic interests across the former Yugoslavia. This destructive ideology is felt throughout the region. After all, Serbian nationalists influence Montenegro, in Bosnia, their influence has caused a constant institutional crisis. Kosovo also suffers. Belgrade blocks the development of Kosovo, its integration into international institutions.
One day, the question of territory exchange may arise again. In 2018, an informal idea was launched: it was proposed that Serbia would recognize Kosovo, but the north of Kosovo would go to Serbia, and the Preševo valley (municipalities in Serbia, populated by Albanians, – UNIAN) would join Kosovo. However, at that time, the idea was not supported by Germany in the person of Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as Russia. The latter is not at all interested in resolving the Kosovo issue. As long as it exists, Russia can count on Serbia as its ally on the international arena.
What impact does Serbia have on other Balkan countries?
Bosnia, due to Serbia and Russia’s support, faces a serious political crisis that threatens the country’s dissolution. Montenegro was a leader in EU integration, but slowed down in 2020 when the Orthodox Church – both Serbian and Russian (although there’s no direct evidence of the latter’s participation) – organized prayer protests. It was a kind of counter-revolution in the country.
Last year, at the elections in December, many voters with Serbian passports were brought to Belgrade from the Republic of Srpska, which is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it was the first effective political technology of the “Serbian world”. These elections were important for President Vučić and the ruling party, as political practice shows, a change of government in the capital leads to a change of government in the republic…
Still, the President of Serbia and his entourage understand that it’s more realistic for them to create the “Serbian world” without Kosovo. Most likely, Belgrade will gradually agree to the development of Kosovo’s statehood, but will demand more influence in the Republic of Srpska, which is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Montenegro, although the latter is a NATO member. The situation on the Ukrainian front will determine whether Serbian nationalists can realize this idea.
The Author of this article is: Iryna Synelnyk
Iryna Synelnyk is a famous journalist from Ukraine, who currently lives in Republic of Kosovo, with which we would be glad to work together from time to time.
