A significant portion of the information consumed by Kosovo’s citizens is produced by media outlets that do not disclose the origin of their funding. Verifying their true revenue streams is often nearly impossible, creating a persistent transparency gap.
Beyond being a target of Russian propaganda, Kosovo is also exposed to China’s economic footprint — despite the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Data provided to BIRN by Kosovo Customs show that 13 percent of all imports into Kosovo in 2025 originated from China. In practical terms, roughly every seventh product entering the country comes from there.
In 2025, imports from China exceeded €919 million, out of a total €7 billion in overall imports — a 9.4 percent increase compared to 2024, when imports from China totaled €840 million out of €6.4 billion. The trend has been steadily upward: €617 million in 2020 and €788 million in 2023.
China remains one of Kosovo’s leading import partners. Mobile phones, industrial machinery, solar panels, furniture, plastics, toys and car parts dominate the market — largely industrial, technological and construction-related goods.
A January 12, 2026 report by the GAP Institute notes that Germany was Kosovo’s largest import partner in 2025 (€1 billion), followed by Turkey (€929 million) and China (around €920 million). China has consistently ranked among the top exporters to Kosovo in 2022, 2023 and 2024.
While goods are meticulously recorded at customs, another dimension of China’s presence remains less visible: the marketing ecosystem and media content potentially financed through trade-related advertising chains.
Advertising Money: The Unseen Dimension
Where there is a market, there is promotion. But how much of that promotion is transparent — and how much blends into editorial content?
“No one in Kosovo has data on how much businesses that import from China advertise in our media. If China is such a large exporter to Kosovo, logically they should also invest in promoting their products,” said Kreshnik Gashi, editor-in-chief of Kallxo.com, during the Kallxo Përnime TV programme.
Across the region, Russian and Chinese economic investments have often been accompanied by media influence.
In February 2026, the Facebook profile “Fushe Kosova press,” with nearly 20,000 followers, shared a video showcasing “intelligent vehicles in China,” despite its stated mission of covering local municipal news. In July 2025, Autoportali published an article analysing the success of electric cars in China. A Facebook group titled “Grupi i miqësisë Shqipëri–Kinë” shared an analysis claiming “Chinese cars are changing history,” later republished by Radio Ejani.
According to Imer Mushkolaj, Director of the Kosovo Press Council, members are obliged to clearly distinguish sponsored material from editorial content and to disclose sponsorship sources, in line with the Code of Ethics.
However, Niman Racaj, Acting CEO of the Independent Media Commission, noted that media financing reports often contain incomplete data. Regulators verify the existence of funds in bank accounts — but not their origin.
“Without financial sustainability, there is no editorial independence,” Racaj emphasised.
Kosovo’s advertising market is estimated at around €15 million annually — “far too small to sustainably finance the entire media landscape,” according to Jeton Mehmeti, former chairman of the Independent Media Council board.
“If financial intelligence has not identified any suspicious Chinese money entering Kosovo’s media to retransmit their narrative as news, that is a problem for me,” Gashi added.
Rebroadcasting Content
In Albania, Radio Ejani — with 1.1 million Facebook followers — operates as a Chinese state media outlet producing Albanian-language content. Its funding structure is not publicly transparent.
Content published by Radio Ejani typically portrays China as economically advanced and a reliable partner, often highlighting bilateral cooperation and success stories. Experts have described such messaging as “soft disinformation,” aimed at presenting China as an alternative to the European Union.
BIRN’s 2023 report “The Story of Our Lies” found that Radio Ejani materials were also shared and rebroadcast in Kosovo. Whether this dissemination is paid or based on informal content-sharing arrangements remains unclear.
Attempts by BIRN to obtain comment from Radio Ejani received no response.
Recent posts from February 26, 2026 included headlines such as: “9 billion yuan in revenue! Chinese films record high ticket sales worldwide,” and “German businesses attach great importance to the Chinese market.” A December 2025 post highlighted an Albanian citizen who found professional success in Shenzhen.
Cybersecurity expert Benjamin Kolenovic notes that authorities can only track bank transactions within Kosovo. Funds transferred through accounts registered abroad are largely inaccessible.
“Anything that happens outside Kosovo, through bank accounts registered abroad, is inaccessible to the state under normal circumstances,” Kolenovic said. He also pointed out that some media outlets register abroad to enable monetisation through platforms like Meta, which is restricted locally.
This further complicates tracing the true source of income.
An article praising Chinese technological innovation or its development model may appear as standard reporting. Without funding transparency, however, the distinction between journalism and commercial or geopolitical promotion becomes blurred.
Officially, direct Chinese investment in Kosovo remains limited. Yet economic influence through trade is significant and growing.
Kosovo thus faces a paradox: China’s economic presence is measurable and expanding, while its potential media influence remains undocumented and largely unexamined.
