Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic meticulously balances maintaining ties with Russia, China, and the West while consolidating his power on the domestic political scene. However, this multi-faceted game could potentially backfire on him if overplayed.
On the margins of the economic forum in Vladivostok on September 4, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin made it clear to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Belgrade is a strategic partner and “ally of Russia.”
Putin reciprocated by inviting his Serbian counterpart Aleksandar Vučić to attend the upcoming BRICS summit in the Russian city of Kazan.
This Slavic solidarity, however, was not approved by the European Union. The following day, EU foreign affairs spokesperson Peter Stano said that “maintaining or even intensifying ties with Russia amid its illegal aggression against the Ukrainian people is inconsistent with EU values.”
Vulin’s visit to Russia might have been even harder for the EU to accept because there have been recent signs that Serbia is moving closer to the European bloc.
At the end of August, Serbia signed an agreement with France to replace its old Russian MiG jets with Rafale aircraft. It had earlier struck a deal with the EU for lithium exploitation for manufacturing batteries for electric cars.
However, contradictory messages are common for Serbia under Vučić, who, over his 12 years in power, has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing relations with the West, Russia, and China.
Those hoping that Serbia’s recent business deals were a sign of its wholehearted turn towards the West might be disappointed.
Ivan Krastev, who leads the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and is a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, tells Radio Free Europe that the agreement with France is not just commercial but “it’s not simple to be on one side, once and for all.”
“This was clear when Vučić said at a press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron on August 29: ‘I know Emmanuel (Macron) would like me to impose sanctions on Russia. But we did not do that and we have no shame about our decision.’” On the surface, recent deals with Germany and France might seem like a kind of “European moment” for Serbia, said Vessela Tcherneva, Deputy Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, to Radio Free Europe.
“But what makes me somewhat skeptical is the fact that we know that besides the pure trade and security dimension, there is also the dimension of democracy and pro-European forces in Serbia. What kind of situation does that place them in?” she asked.
Vučić does not initially come from a Western democratic background. In the late 1990s, he was the Minister of Information in the Government of Serbia during the final years of Slobodan Milošević’s regime. He was a senior official in the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party, from which he distanced himself in 2008.
While Milošević was internationally perceived as a “pariah” and “Balkan butcher” due to his role in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, Vučić is mostly cooperative on the global stage, and the EU and the US treat him as an essential and key actor for stability in the Balkans.
The “Third Way” on an international level has always been part of Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s DNA.
Serbian officials still like to say that Serbia is the “East of the West” and the “West of the East.” Vučić’s balancing approach has a strong precedent in the long-term Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, who was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, an alliance of states that maintained a neutral position between the Western and Soviet blocs.
Serbia, however, is not as strong as Yugoslavia once was – and this means Vučić’s policy requires greater flexibility and continuous adaptation.
Vučić is adept at making deals with Serbia’s international partners, ensuring that he gives something to all interested parties, but, more importantly, not giving everything to anyone.
In this regard, the EU is Serbia’s largest investor, including 96 million euros ($106 million) in 2024 for modernizing roads and railways, in addition to projects to support Serbia’s transition to green energy.
However, Russia controls Serbia’s Oil Industry (NIS) and China, through Zijin Mining Group, owns 63% of RTB Bor, the country’s largest mining company.
Vučić has also opened Serbia to the Arab world. The United Arab Emirates have invested millions of dollars in the “Belgrade on the Water” project, which is accompanied by various controversies – from allegations of land usurpation to corruption.
The US has not been left out either. In May, Serbia made a deal with Jared Kushner, son-in-law of former US President and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, to build a commercial and residential complex on the ruins of the Ministry of Defense of former Yugoslavia in central Belgrade, which was destroyed during the 1999 NATO campaign led by the United States.
With the US presidential elections in November, many observers interpreted this deal with Kushner as preparation by Serbian authorities for a possible return of Trump to the White House.
However, in a recent interview with the British Financial Times, Vučić insisted it was merely a “business venture.”
As always, he tries to position himself well among different parties. “My friend (Hungarian Prime Minister) Viktor (Orbán) is 100% on Trump’s side,” Vučić told the Financial Times.
“My friends from Brussels are 100% on Biden’s side. I am not. I am on the Serbian side and I am waiting for the results,” Vučić said.
He took a similar approach with Ukraine, trying to diversify risks. Although Serbia refuses to support Western sanctions against Russia, it simultaneously supplies Ukraine with grenades through third countries worth 800 million euros since 2022, or a third of the European contingent total.
Serbia’s relations with Russia, although complex and burdened by history, follow Vučić’s policy of “pushing and giving” and zigzagging. The two Slavic nations are historically and spiritually close, and Serbia diplomatically relies on Russia, for example, in blocking Kosovo’s admission to the UN.
However, Vučić tries to keep a distance from Russia in certain situations.
Immediately before German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Belgrade on July 19 to sign the lithium agreement, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko arrived in the Serbian capital.
An internal source told the Financial Times that the meeting was “cold.”
“Grushko sat down and began reading a list of 23 complaints, including the Kremlin’s anger over Belgrade’s decision to supply Ukraine with ammunition,” the source told the British newspaper. “When Grushko had gone through about half of the list, Vučić stood up, announced that the meeting was over, and left,” according to the Financial Times.
Vučić gave a reserved response on Thursday to Putin’s invitation to join the BRICS summit in Russia in October, saying that Serbia would have important guests during that period.
However, on Friday he moderated his response, saying he would decide whether to attend the summit on October 10 or 15, as he did not want to reject or accept anything.
“There is no doubt it is an important call, as we had previously planned important visits,” Vučić said.
Ivan Krastev says that during that time Belgrade is expected to be visited by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
Speaking at the Globsec forum in Prague on August 31, Vučić dismissed the idea that Belgrade is the “Trojan horse” of the Kremlin, saying that he had not had personal contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin for two and a half years.
“While Vučić relies heavily on Russia,” said Kurt Volker, former US Ambassador to NATO and US envoy to Ukraine, to Radio Free Europe, “he still tries to maintain a degree of maneuverability and independence.”
While Serbian authorities present the country as an “economic tiger” with one of the highest growth rates in Europe, the country still faces numerous obstacles.
According to a July assessment by the US International Trade Administration, “these challenges include weak rule of law; political interference in the economy; a slow judicial system that is sensitive to political pressure; real and perceived corruption issues; an overly complex and sometimes opaque bureaucracy (and) a murky tendering process.”
Stronger Than Milošević
Vučić’s position, by some standards, is stronger than that of Milošević, who died in 2006 in The Hague prison, where he was tried for war crimes. Thus, Vučić’s party managed to gain power in the central municipalities of Belgrade where Milošević could not even at the height of his power.
“Under Vučić, we see the strengthening of Serbian nationalism, attempts to undermine Montenegro. We have seen efforts to support (Bosnian Serb leader) Milorad Dodik and to undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Volker said.
Given that nearly 70 percent of Serbia’s trade is with the European Union, many are questioning whether Vučić is truly committed to EU principles, or if Serbia’s ambition to join is motivated only by economic necessity.
Vučić runs politics almost like a perpetual election campaign: keeping his opponents – even his partners – on the defensive and waiting for his next move.
Although Vučić was the one who struck a deal with Western countries for lithium exploitation, at the same time he accuses some Western security services of encouraging protests against this project and a “color revolution” to destroy it.
Even though Vučić’s policy seems pragmatic, there is a risk that in the end Serbia’s international partners may lose trust in him.
