Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s declaration in Užice that “Kosovo is Serbia. It was, is and will be” appears to be more than a repetition of Belgrade’s longstanding position on Kosovo.
Coming at a time when Vučić’s government is facing an unusually strong challenge from the student movement and early parliamentary elections are increasingly being discussed as a realistic possibility, the renewed emphasis on Kosovo can also be viewed as part of a broader political strategy aimed at mobilizing nationalist voters and consolidating his traditional support base.
Kosovo has long held a special place in Serbia’s domestic politics. For decades, it has functioned as a national symbol, an identity issue and a political reference point used to define positions toward both the government and the opposition.
For Vučić, returning the issue to the center of political messaging offers an opportunity to shift public debate away from domestic problems toward an issue where nationalist rhetoric has significant mobilizing power.
That calculation becomes particularly relevant if opinion scenarios suggest that the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) could face a considerably more difficult electoral contest than in previous elections.
A scenario cited by Serbia’s Bureau for Social Research (BIRODI), for example, projected a student-backed list at 48.5 percent and a list associated with SNS and Vučić at 38.6 percent. These figures are not a conventional opinion poll and should not be treated as a prediction of the final result. They nevertheless illustrate a political scenario in which Vučić could have a strong incentive to maximize turnout and consolidate his electorate.
In such circumstances, Kosovo can serve as a powerful mobilizing issue, particularly among voters who view politics through the prism of nationalism, sovereignty and relations with the West.
Shifting the electoral debate
Vučić’s challenge is not simply competition from another political party. The student movement has attempted to change the focus of Serbia’s political debate itself, emphasizing institutions, corruption, political accountability and the functioning of the state.
Kosovo offers a fundamentally different narrative.
Instead of allowing an election campaign to be dominated by questions about domestic governance, protests and institutional failures, the political debate can be redirected toward “defending national interests,” resisting “Western pressure” and protecting Serbia’s position on Kosovo.
This is a familiar political strategy: when a government faces significant domestic pressure, a highly emotional external issue can be used to reinforce political identity and consolidate support.
Kosovo is particularly suitable for this purpose in Vučić’s case because it allows him to present himself simultaneously as a leader defending Serbia’s national interests and as a political actor maintaining negotiations and relations with Western powers.
One message for two audiences
Vučić’s statement in Užice also carries a broader political message.
By saying that Kosovo “was, is and will be” Serbia, he is not addressing only the domestic electorate. The statement can also be interpreted as a signal to international actors that Belgrade does not intend to abandon its constitutional and political position on Kosovo, despite its dialogue with Prishtina and pressure from the European Union.
But the primary audience remains domestic.
Ahead of a possible election campaign, such a statement is politically far easier to deploy than a detailed discussion of economic indicators, student protests or institutional problems. Kosovo generates an immediate emotional response, while questions of governance require a more complex debate that is more difficult for any government to control politically.
At the same time, intensive use of Kosovo as an electoral instrument carries risks.
If elections become primarily a referendum on nationalism, relations with the West and Kosovo, the space for debate over issues directly affecting Serbian citizens could narrow considerably.
There is also a potential contradiction for Vučić.
On the international stage, Serbia is seeking to maintain relations with the EU and advance its European integration process. Domestically, however, the Serbian president has a political interest in maintaining rhetoric that positions him as a defender of national interests.
That allows Vučić to operate on two political tracks at once: negotiating with Western governments while presenting himself to his electorate as a leader who will not give up Kosovo.
Kosovo as a campaign issue
If early parliamentary elections are held in October, the intensity of this rhetoric could become an important indicator of how the campaign develops.
If the student movement continues to enjoy significant political momentum while SNS struggles to mobilize its traditional electorate, Kosovo could become one of the central themes used to move the campaign back onto terrain where Vučić has traditionally held an advantage: nationalism, security and foreign policy.
That does not necessarily mean that Vučić’s statement proves Kosovo is being used solely for electoral purposes. The issue remains a genuine and central component of Serbia’s state policy and of the political identity of a significant segment of Serbian society.
But timing, language and political context matter.
The key question is therefore not only what Vučić believes about Kosovo, but why he has chosen to make Kosovo one of his central political messages again at this particular moment.
In that sense, Kosovo can function not only as an issue of Serbian foreign policy, but also as an instrument of domestic politics — a mobilizing card that Vučić can use to strengthen his political base at a time when, according to some scenarios, the electoral risks facing his government may be greater than usual.
