The Kremlin appears to be demanding NATO’s withdrawal from large parts of Eastern Europe. What would this mean for the security of millions of Europeans, and what lies behind Russia’s plan?
During negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, Russian representatives in Abu Dhabi reportedly presented a document containing far-reaching demands. The development was reported by The New York Times.
According to the newspaper, the document, dated November 10, calls not only for an end to Western arms supplies to Ukraine, but also demands that NATO withdraw its troops and military bases to the positions they occupied in 1997.
What does Russia mean by 1997?
By referring to 1997, the Kremlin means NATO before its first eastward expansion. At that time, the alliance had 16 members. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary had already been invited to join, but did not formally become members until two years later.
In the following years, additional countries from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe joined the alliance, followed more recently by Nordic countries. Today, NATO comprises 32 member states across Europe and North America.
According to the report, Russia is not explicitly demanding that Central and Eastern European countries leave NATO. Rather, its primary demand is to end the alliance’s military presence in those countries.
What would a NATO withdrawal mean?
The withdrawal of NATO troops and military bases from member states that joined the alliance after 1997 would significantly weaken their defence readiness.
One example is NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. Since 2004, NATO allies, including Germany’s Bundeswehr, have monitored the airspace over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As the Baltic states do not have their own fighter aircraft to independently police their airspace, NATO carries out this mission on their behalf.
Since 2026, the mission has become part of a broader air defence presence. The planned deployment of a Bundeswehr brigade in Lithuania, expected to become fully operational by the end of 2027, would also have to be halted under Russia’s demands.
Meanwhile, Romania is expanding Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base near Constanța, on the Black Sea. Once completed, it is expected to become NATO’s largest air base in Europe by area, even larger than Ramstein Air Base in Germany.
“We will under no circumstances allow anyone to establish new security rules for this part of the world over the heads of Poland and Europe,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told TVP World.
His Bulgarian counterpart, Rumen Radev, described a NATO withdrawal as “unthinkable and unrealistic”. No country should be forced by external pressure to abandon its decision to join an alliance.
Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal has also rejected Russia having a say in decisions concerning Europe’s security architecture.
“We have nothing to discuss with Russia about the European security architecture; it is functioning well,” he said.
Nevertheless, the firm opposition expressed by Eastern European NATO governments reflects a deeper concern along the alliance’s eastern flank: that an agreement between Washington and Moscow could turn their security into a bargaining chip.
Why is the mutual defence commitment not enough?
Under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all. The other allies are obliged to assist the country under attack.
Each member state determines the measures it considers necessary, which may include the use of military force.
For this mutual defence commitment to deter a potential aggressor, that aggressor must believe NATO can respond rapidly and effectively in the event of an attack.
The deployment of alliance troops along NATO’s eastern flank serves precisely this purpose.
A withdrawal would make defence more difficult and could lead Moscow to calculate that an attack would carry fewer risks.
Who decides which alliances countries join?
European countries have agreed that every state has the right to decide independently which security alliances it wishes to join.
NATO refers to Article 10 of its founding treaty and its Open Door Policy, which allows eligible European countries to seek membership.
The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act also explicitly established that neither side has the right to veto the decisions of the other.
Under the Charter of Paris, adopted in November 1990 by the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), including the Soviet Union, countries committed themselves to respecting each state’s freedom to choose its own security arrangements.
Was there ever a promise not to expand NATO eastward?
During negotiations over German reunification, then-US Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher used language referring to limitations on NATO’s eastward expansion.
These statements were made in the context of negotiations over the membership of a reunified Germany in NATO and the possible deployment of NATO forces in the territory of the former East Germany.
However, no legally binding, generally applicable written agreement was ever concluded prohibiting NATO from expanding into other former Warsaw Pact countries.
In the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, both sides declared that they no longer considered each other adversaries.
NATO stated that, under the security conditions existing at the time and foreseeable in the future, it intended to provide collective defence through reinforcement rather than the additional permanent stationing of “substantial combat forces”.
The agreement did not grant Moscow any explicit veto power over NATO decisions.
Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and existing borders, and to refrain from using force against it. These assurances were linked to Ukraine’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons.
However, the memorandum did not impose an obligation on the United States or the United Kingdom to provide military defence to Ukraine in the event of an attack. NATO membership was not part of the agreement at the time.
Why is this demand back on the negotiating table?
The document cited by The New York Times represents a negotiating position. It reportedly carries neither an official letterhead nor a signature and primarily reflects Moscow’s demands, which had already been made public in a similar form in December 2021.
Just over two months before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin presented two draft agreements to the United States and NATO. They called for NATO to abandon further expansion.
The draft agreement with NATO also proposed that Russia and NATO member states that belonged to the alliance on May 27, 1997, refrain from deploying additional troops and weapons on the territory of other European states beyond the levels stationed there on that date.
Security guarantees for the post-war period and Europe’s future security architecture were also on the agenda of the Abu Dhabi talks.
If negotiations over ending the war in Ukraine were now expanded to include NATO troop deployments and the alliance’s future enlargement, Moscow would gain additional influence over Europe’s security arrangements.
Russia has long insisted that the “root causes” of the war must be addressed. According to the Kremlin, these include NATO enlargement and the alliance’s military presence in Eastern Europe.
So far, no major Western actor has indicated a willingness to accept the Russian demands presented in Abu Dhabi.
Former Polish intelligence services coordinator Stanisław Żaryn, by contrast, interprets the negotiations as an attempt by Moscow to buy time and weaken the West ahead of a potential future confrontation.
Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza has also described a return to the 1997 status quo as unrealistic, comparing it to the prospect of Finland leaving NATO.
