Arben Fetoshi, director of the Octopus Institute for Hybrid Warfare Studies, has argued that recent declarations by municipalities in Montenegro calling for the “withdrawal” of Kosovo’s recognition are part of a broader political strategy linked to the concept of the “Serbian World.”
In an analysis published on Facebook, Fetoshi said that the recognition of a state falls exclusively within the competence of Montenegro’s central institutions, meaning municipal declarations have no legal effect. However, he argued that such initiatives are being used as political and propaganda tools.
According to Fetoshi, Serbia is using municipalities where it has political influence in Montenegro to increase pressure on state institutions and promote narratives aimed at weakening the country’s Euro-Atlantic orientation.
He pointed to Milan Knežević, leader of the Democratic People’s Party (DNP), as a key figure behind the initiative, claiming that the politician has openly stated his intention to encourage more municipalities to adopt similar declarations, with the ultimate goal of creating pressure for a binding resolution in Montenegro’s Parliament.
Fetoshi argued that the campaign should be viewed in the broader context of what he described as hybrid operations designed to advance the “Serbian World” project. He also referenced the alleged attempt to undermine the Tivat Summit on June 4, saying the initiative to challenge Kosovo’s recognition serves primarily as a mobilizing issue due to its symbolic significance in Serbian nationalist narratives.
“The recognition of Kosovo is presented as a symbol of betrayal, shame, and injustice, while the real strategic objective is to weaken Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Such an outcome would represent a major victory for the ‘Serbian World’ project,” Fetoshi said.
He added that Knežević’s calls for younger politicians to “correct the shame” inflicted on Serbia are not based on Montenegro’s national interests but rather on what he described as Serbian national interests. According to Fetoshi, this reflects the essence of the “Serbian World” concept, which views ethnic Serbs living in neighboring countries as part of a common political space centered on Belgrade.
Although the municipal declarations carry no legal force, Fetoshi warned that they could still serve as effective propaganda by creating the impression that Montenegro’s foreign policy decisions can be challenged at the local level.
He described the strategy as a typical hybrid influence model in which “facts” are first established where resistance is weakest before being presented as expressions of popular will to increase political pressure on central institutions.
“Statements claiming that Kosovo ‘is not recognized within the territory of a municipality’ are legally absurd, but they are intended to convey the message that Montenegro lacks sovereignty and control over its foreign policy,” Fetoshi argued.
He further claimed that the campaign is reinforced by what he described as hybrid influence operations involving the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA), aimed at weakening Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic institutions and creating opportunities for greater Serbian, Russian, and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans.
According to Fetoshi, the broader narrative promoted by Serbian state-aligned media portrays Montenegro’s independent foreign policy decisions—including NATO membership, its European Union accession path, recognition of Kosovo, and sanctions against Russia—as acts of “betrayal” that should be reversed.
He concluded that Kosovo continues to serve as a central mobilizing issue within the “Serbian World” narrative, while municipal declarations, despite lacking legal validity, risk fueling political polarization, strengthening pro-Serbian political forces, increasing pressure on Montenegro’s government, and complicating the country’s European integration process.
