NATO’s geographic diversity is often portrayed as a potential weakness, with different regions facing different threats and therefore developing competing security priorities. But the Alliance’s regional divisions could instead become a strategic asset if they are managed through greater political understanding and “strategic empathy.”
The argument, outlined in an analysis published by Defence24, is that geography inevitably shapes how NATO allies perceive security. Finland, Lithuania and Poland will naturally view the European security environment differently from Spain, Italy or Türkiye. That does not necessarily represent fragmentation; rather, it can allow allies to develop specialized expertise and capabilities where they are most needed.
NATO’s military planning has increasingly moved in this direction, with regional defense plans, higher readiness, new force structures and greater emphasis on regional capabilities. The political dimension, however, has been slower to adapt.
Different threats, different perceptions
For NATO’s northeastern allies, Russia represents an immediate and potentially existential military threat. From Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Warsaw or Helsinki, developments in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East may appear less urgent.
The perspective from southern Europe is different.
Russia remains a serious threat, but southern allies also face direct consequences from instability in North Africa and the Middle East, terrorism, irregular migration, maritime insecurity, energy disruptions and growing geopolitical competition across the Mediterranean.
Neither perspective is irrational.
The problem arises when different perceptions of urgency become arguments over which threats are more legitimate.
The analysis argues that NATO does not need every ally to view every threat in exactly the same way. Instead, the Alliance needs to recognize why different allies prioritize different challenges and organize those differences into a coherent division of responsibilities.
Security threats increasingly cross regional boundaries
The distinction between NATO’s northern, northeastern and southern security environments is also becoming less clear.
Instability originating in the Middle East, for example, can quickly affect energy prices, maritime trade, supply chains, migration pressures and domestic politics across Europe.
The recent conflict involving Iran illustrates this dynamic. Events taking place thousands of kilometers from the Baltic region can generate almost immediate economic, political and security consequences there.
Russian pressure can also affect southern allies indirectly through defense spending, energy security, economic disruption, support for Ukraine and the gradual erosion of Europe’s broader security architecture.
The result is an increasingly interconnected security environment in which regional threats rarely remain confined to one geographic area.
NATO’s northern transformation
The integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO has further reshaped the Alliance’s northern security architecture.
The Arctic, Nordic region and North Atlantic are increasingly being treated as a more coherent operational space, while initiatives such as Arctic Sentry and NATO’s enhanced presence in Finland demonstrate the growing importance of regional specialization.
The analysis argues that this process should not be interpreted as another form of division.
Instead, regionalization can strengthen NATO when it connects different parts of the Alliance rather than isolating them.
The same principle, it argues, should apply to NATO’s southern flank.
The missing ingredient: strategic empathy
The analysis proposes “strategic empathy” as a complementary political habit.
Strategic empathy does not require one ally to accept another ally’s threat assessment or to regard every challenge as equally dangerous. It means understanding why another ally sees its security environment differently and recognizing that political support for one region’s priorities will depend partly on whether its concerns are taken seriously.
For northeastern allies, understanding the South should not be viewed as a concession or act of charity. It is a form of strategic governance.
The same applies in the opposite direction.
Southern allies must also recognize the seriousness of Russia’s military threat to NATO’s northeastern members and the importance of deterrence and defense against Moscow remaining the Alliance’s primary military priority.
A more mature division of responsibilities
Greater European responsibility for conventional defense is likely to increase regional specialization.
Northern and northeastern allies will naturally carry a greater share of the burden for deterrence against Russia, while southern allies will remain essential to security across the Mediterranean and its wider neighborhood.
That should not be viewed as fragmentation.
It can represent a more mature division of labor — provided regional specialization does not become regional indifference.
The analysis proposes several ways to reinforce that political cohesion, including stronger ministerial coordination, closer links between regional initiatives, greater exchanges among experts and parliamentarians, and more visible cross-regional contributions to NATO missions, exercises and operations.
Even relatively small military contributions can have political value if they demonstrate that specialization does not mean indifference to the security concerns of other allies.
Building bridges between NATO’s regions
Public diplomacy also has an important role.
Northeastern European voices could speak more frequently about the security challenges facing the South, while southern allies could do more to explain why Russia’s threat to NATO’s eastern flank matters to the entire Alliance.
Such efforts may appear modest, but public perceptions are shaped largely by the threats that feel closest and most immediate.
NATO has invested heavily in military interoperability. As the Alliance becomes more regionally specialized, it may also need greater political and public interoperability.
The goal should not be to eliminate regional differences or force every ally to prioritize the same threats.
Instead, NATO should ensure that its regional diversity works in favor of the Alliance rather than becoming a source of political division.
Geography shapes threats. Threats shape perceptions. Perceptions shape interests. And interests determine where allies devote their most limited political resource: attention.
NATO’s challenge is therefore not to erase its geographic differences, but to make them work together.
A stronger, more European and more regionally specialized NATO can become a more cohesive Alliance — if strategic specialization is accompanied by the ability to understand the priorities of allies looking at the same map from a different direction.
