Despite the European Union’s restrictions on Russian state media, pro-Kremlin narratives continue to reach Greek audiences through a different route: disinformation is repackaged by fringe websites and then amplified by mainstream or highly popular media outlets.
A recent example involved a fabricated story claiming that the parents of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky were being investigated for corruption after allegedly holding $11 million in their bank accounts.
The claim was false and was debunked by the Greek fact-checking organization Ellinika Hoaxes. Yet the story had already spread beyond openly pro-Russian websites and appeared on Newsbomb, a widely read Greek-language news platform.
That is precisely what makes the phenomenon more dangerous.
Russian disinformation does not always need direct access to Russian media channels. Instead, fabricated stories can originate within pro-Kremlin information networks, circulate through social media and fringe websites, and eventually be picked up by larger media platforms. Once published by a recognizable news outlet, the original propaganda can appear legitimate to audiences who may never encounter its Russian source.
The Zelensky story also came with apparently fabricated visual material. A video circulating online was presented as if it were from Europe Today, a program associated with Euronews. Fact-checkers identified inconsistencies in the Euronews branding, indicating that the footage had been manipulated or falsely attributed.
Ellinika Hoaxes linked the story to Matryoshka, also known as Operation Overload, a Russian disinformation operation documented for producing fabricated articles, videos, memes and deepfakes designed to imitate or exploit the credibility of established Western media organizations.
The strategy is relatively simple but highly effective: create the lie, disguise its origin, attach it to a familiar media brand, and allow legitimate-looking outlets and social media users to amplify it.
This process is often described as “disinformation laundering.” The objective is not necessarily to convince everyone of a particular falsehood. It is to make fabricated claims appear credible enough to enter mainstream discussion, create confusion and undermine trust in reliable journalism.
The Greek case demonstrates why banning Russian state media alone cannot eliminate Russian propaganda. The information ecosystem is much more complicated. Propaganda can cross borders without carrying a Russian label and can reach mainstream audiences through domestic websites, social media accounts and apparently independent sources.
The real vulnerability is therefore not simply the existence of Russian propaganda—it is the willingness of media platforms and audiences to amplify sensational claims before verifying them.
In the age of information warfare, the question is no longer only “Where did this story come from?” It is also “Who gave the story credibility by repeating it?”
