One of the biggest problems that continues to emerge in relations between Kosovo and Serbia is Belgrade’s attempt to maintain political influence over the Serb community in Kosovo.
At the center of this policy stands the Serbian List a political entity that for years has been considered one of the main instruments through which Serbia seeks to maintain its influence in Kosovo. Its history itself shows that its ties with Belgrade have been much deeper than an ordinary political relationship. The Serbian List was established in 2013 with strong support from Belgrade and was conceived as the main political instrument of the Serb community in Kosovo.
This raises a simple but fundamental question:
How independent is the Serbian List really from Belgrade?
A Party Under Belgrade’s Shadow
For years, the Serbian List has been closely connected to Serbia’s politics and to political structures directed from Belgrade. Analysts in the region have assessed that the party has had little room for independent politics and that support from Belgrade has been essential to its political power.
This makes it difficult to see the Serbian List simply as a local political entity.
It has become one of the main channels through which Belgrade’s politics is articulated and projected inside Kosovo.
The problem is not Kosovo’s Serb community. The problem is the political use of that community as an instrument of Serbia’s interests.
Radoičić and the Shadow of Parallel Structures
The name of Milan Radoičić makes this story even more serious.
Radoičić was a former deputy leader of the Serbian List and for years was considered a highly influential figure in northern Kosovo. In 2023, he admitted that he had organized and participated in the armed attack in Banjska, where Kosovo Police officer Afrim Bunjaku was killed.
The United States had previously sanctioned Radoičić for links to suspected corruption and transnational organized crime networks, while the United Kingdom also imposed sanctions on him.
Therefore, when his name appears in the political history of the Serbian List, this is not simply about a party figure.
It concerns a person who has been at the center of international allegations and sanctions and who has been publicly linked to one of the most serious security incidents in Kosovo.
Belgrade Seeks Influence Without Responsibility
This is one of the greatest contradictions in Serbia’s policy toward Kosovo.
Belgrade seeks to maintain political influence over the Serb community, supports political structures that serve this influence, and at the same time attempts to present itself as an external party to internal political developments in Kosovo.
But these two claims can hardly stand together.
You cannot demand influence without accepting the political responsibility that comes with it.
The more Belgrade controls the narrative, financing and political direction of Serbian structures in Kosovo, the clearer it becomes that this is a policy of organized influence.
The Serb Community Is Not Belgrade
A clear distinction must be made.
Kosovo’s Serb citizens are not Belgrade.
Their interests should not automatically be identified with the interests of the Serbian government.
They have the right to be politically represented, to seek economic development and to participate in public life.
But this representation should not be used as a channel for exporting Belgrade’s politics into Kosovo.
Kosovo’s Serbs have the right to a political voice. Belgrade has no right to speak that voice on their behalf.
An Old Model of Influence
The problem with the Serbian List does not lie only in one statement or one decision.
It is a model that has been built over the years.
Political support from Belgrade.
Coordination with Serbian political structures.
Boycotts and political pressure.
And, in certain cases, serious confrontations that have shown how far the politics of instrumentalization can go.
Even analysts from Serbia have argued that the Serbian List’s dependence on Belgrade limits its ability to act as an independent political partner.
This is why the debate should not be reduced to the question of what the Serbian List wants.
The bigger question is:
What does Belgrade want through the Serbian List?
Serbia Cannot Decide for Kosovo From a Distance
Serbia may have political interests in Kosovo.
It may have ties with the Serb community.
It may support parties it considers allies.
But one thing must be clear:
Political influence is not sovereignty.
Kosovo has its own institutions and its citizens have the right to decide the future of their country.
Belgrade’s attempt to maintain political leverage through structures connected to it does not change this reality.
In the end, the question about the Serbian List remains as direct as possible:
Is it the independent voice of Kosovo’s Serbs — or Belgrade’s political extension in Kosovo?
The more political ties, dependence and the role of figures connected to it come to light, the harder it becomes for Belgrade to claim that the Serbian List is simply a local entity without external influence.
Belgrade may seek influence in Kosovo. But it does not have the right to decide for Kosovo.
