Two espionage cases in Kosovo point to the interest of Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) in individuals linked to radical Islamist circles from gathering information to, according to Kosovo prosecutors, identifying people who could potentially be targeted for contact and recruitment.
While experts say such activities may have security and counterterrorism objectives, they warn that they could also form part of a broader strategy by Belgrade to establish intelligence networks and expand political influence in Kosovo, Radio Free Europe reports.
Kosovo authorities arrested Fehim Sali on August 13 on suspicion of espionage, a crime punishable by at least five years in prison.
According to the Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s request for his detention, Sali allegedly provided a BIA official with information about the political situation in Kosovo and identified members of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency.
The same document states that he also provided information about individuals who “belong to the Wahhabi sect,” as well as other people whom he allegedly later proposed to the BIA official as potential targets for contact and recruitment.
The prosecution said that evidence includes transcripts of conversations indicating that the suspect maintained contact with the BIA official and provided relevant information and various forms of assistance in recruiting other individuals.
Sali, who is also a Serbian citizen, had traveled to Serbia. During a search of his home, authorities reportedly found four phones and €40,000.
The court approved a 30-day detention request after prosecutors argued that the evidence demonstrated his alleged cooperation with the Serbian BIA.
The BIA did not respond to Radio Free Europe’s questions regarding the allegations.
This is not the only case.
In June, the Basic Court in Pristina sentenced Hysri Selimi to six years in prison for espionage on behalf of the BIA. According to the indictment, he had allegedly worked for the Serbian intelligence service for more than 15 years.
Selimi had traveled to Syria in late 2015 and joined the terrorist organization Islamic State. After returning to Kosovo, he served a prison sentence for participation in terrorist organizations.
Prosecutors alleged that he provided the BIA with information about the number of Albanians who had joined Islamic State, their organization and activities in Syria, as well as other information after his return to Kosovo.
According to the indictment, he received up to €700 per month from the BIA for this information. Selimi denied the allegations and pleaded not guilty.
Predrag Petrović of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) says that gathering information about radicalized groups could be explained by Serbia’s security interests.
However, Washington-based security and foreign-policy expert Adrian Shtuni argues that the cases should also be viewed within the broader context of Serbian intelligence activities in Kosovo.
Shtuni, an associate of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, says intelligence on extremist networks and radicalization trends clearly has value for counterterrorism and threat monitoring.
But, according to him, the cases of Sali and Selimi — considered alongside Serbia’s broader priorities in Kosovo — “point to objectives that go beyond this.”
“The Serbian BIA and affiliated services view Kosovo as a key national-security issue rather than an ordinary foreign-intelligence target,” Shtuni said.
In this context, he argues that operations involving Sali and Selimi should also be viewed as part of broader efforts aimed at “maintaining the policy of non-recognition of Kosovo, building and expanding influence levers in Kosovo, and limiting Kosovo’s consolidation as a sovereign state.”
Petrović, meanwhile, believes Serbia “overstates” the threat posed by violent extremism and terrorism potentially emerging from Salafist communities, in an effort to portray the region to Western countries as a destabilizing environment and a potential threat to Europe itself.
“In a way, it seems they are playing on the fear that still exists around this issue,” Petrović told RFE/RL.
Is the BIA Trying to Strengthen Salafist Networks in Kosovo?
A source within Kosovo’s prosecution told RFE/RL that the Serbian intelligence service is “actively working to create a more negative image of Kosovo” and that one way of doing so is by “strengthening Salafist/Wahhabi networks and encouraging the formation of larger groups.”
“The goal is to strengthen a particular narrative and present it to the international community, claiming that Wahhabi networks exist in Kosovo and that, for this reason, the country is incapable of functioning independently as a democratic state,” the source said.
RFE/RL was unable to independently verify the claim that the BIA is attempting to strengthen such networks in Kosovo.
Shtuni says a clear distinction must be made between collecting intelligence and monitoring developments within radicalized communities, on the one hand, and identifying and proposing potential recruits in order to expand an agent network, on the other.
“This is the broader picture, which is consistent with the way states involved in unresolved territorial disputes typically direct the activities of their intelligence services,” he said.
Shtuni points out that between 2024 and 2026, Kosovo authorities arrested individuals with different profiles on suspicion of cooperating with the Serbian intelligence service.
According to allegations by Kosovo investigative authorities, suspects in these cases were involved, among other things, in collecting operational information about the police, identifying Kosovo Intelligence Agency officials, influencing narratives surrounding wartime events, gathering political and on-the-ground information, and compromising institutions.
Among those facing espionage charges in Kosovo are Bojan Jevtić, a Kosovo Border Police lieutenant, and Jellena Gjukanović, who had worked for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Kosovo.
Why Are Salafist Networks of Interest to the BIA?
Predrag Petrović of the BCSP says Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are two of the main areas in the Western Balkans where Islamist extremism has emerged, and that the Serbian intelligence service’s interest in this phenomenon is not new.
“The goal is that, through people you have recruited, you gain knowledge about their activities so that you can prevent risks and threats to Serbia’s security, because the Wahhabi community has been identified as an environment from which violent extremists, and even terrorists, could potentially emerge,” Petrović said.
Another reason for the Serbian intelligence service to collect information about Islamist networks, according to Petrović, is the possibility of sharing that intelligence with Western security services, for whom the issue remains a high priority.
“Salafist or Wahhabi communities are under constant surveillance by these security services. In this way, the Serbian service positions itself as a relevant partner for intelligence-sharing and as an actor that may possess important information from the ground,” he said.
Shtuni, meanwhile, believes recruitment within radical Islamist networks could also indicate attempts to “instrumentalize them in pursuit of Serbia’s or the intelligence service’s objectives,” going beyond passive security monitoring.
“Maintaining agent networks within sensitive social and religious circles creates opportunities for future influence, destabilization or exploitation of crises,” he said.
Shtuni argues that a potential penetration of radical Islamist networks in Kosovo by the Serbian BIA could have consequences for Kosovo’s internal security, interethnic relations, and the already fragile relationship between Kosovo and Serbia.
