US President Donald Trump spent the final weeks of campaigning for the US midterm elections predicting that the war with Iran would end “right after the elections.”
The votes have now been counted, and his Republican Party is facing losses in both chambers of Congress — a setback that Vice President JD Vance attributed to the conflict.
“The reason we lost was the war,” Vance wrote on X on November 4. Trump said the assessment was “largely true”, but insisted that he would make the same decision again because “Iran cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon”.
With the Democratic Party set to take control of Congress’s budgetary powers and committee leadership in less than two months, Trump faces a narrower set of options: negotiate, escalate the conflict or maintain the current situation.
“Democrats do not take control today,” Shayan Samii, a US-based national security expert, told Radio Free Europe’s Radio Farda. “Trump still has two months to act without being affected by the implications of the election results, if he wants to resume the military campaign.”
A president can justify military action on national security grounds, Samii said. Any legislation aimed at restricting the war would require Trump’s signature or a two-thirds majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to override a presidential veto.
“Some experts believe Democrats could change the course of the military confrontation with the Islamic Republic. I do not see it that way,” he added.
Scenario 1: A Full-Scale Resumption of the War
Trump has repeatedly suggested that large-scale attacks could resume after the elections, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly been pressuring him to take that step.
A renewed military campaign would likely follow the pattern of the April offensive, when US and Israeli strikes targeted bridges, railway lines and energy infrastructure. Trump also threatened to set “every power plant in Iran” on fire.
On Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export terminal, only military facilities have so far been targeted. Striking the island’s energy infrastructure would represent a further escalation that Washington has not yet undertaken. The naval blockade of Iranian ports has already brought the country’s oil exports close to zero.
Shahin Modarres, an Iranian security expert based in Rome, expects that threshold to be crossed.
“Unfortunately, I see a fierce war ahead of us,” he told Radio Farda.
Modarres said Washington had pursued its strategy in several stages. It initially relied on deterrence, followed by an economic pressure campaign after a memorandum of understanding failed in June. He described that proposed agreement as highly favourable to Tehran. The subsequent measures included tougher sanctions, flight restrictions and partial closures of Iran’s land borders.
With that pressure failing to produce results, Modarres argued, the next stage would be to force Tehran into capitulation.
At that point, he said, the country’s infrastructure, energy sector and wider economy would become targets, alongside what remains of Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. He specifically mentioned “Pickaxe Mountain”, a fortified underground complex near Natanz that Trump has threatened to attack since July.
The objective, according to Modarres, would be to push Iran towards collapse until the Islamic Republic surrendered. Elements of the current leadership could then take control, at least temporarily, potentially increasing the chances of the entire system eventually collapsing.
Tehran, however, has warned of the consequences of a renewed conflict.
On October 31, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei reportedly ordered commanders to prepare an “immediate, impactful and geographically unrestricted response” to any new attack, while also expanding the list of potential targets.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has threatened to target underwater communications cables in the Persian Gulf. It has also warned that US military bases outside the Middle East and regional energy infrastructure could come under attack.
Iran has suggested that a future conflict could involve even more countries than the previous 40-day war, during which Tehran expanded the confrontation across the region. A resumption of hostilities would also likely push fuel prices higher.
Scenario 2: A Major Strike Followed by Withdrawal
Although considered less likely, an intermediate option could appeal to a president seeking to claim a military victory without committing to a prolonged war.
Reports in late October suggested that the Trump administration had warned regional allies that a short but intensive military operation against Iran could take place after the elections.
One of the main targets could be Pickaxe Mountain. Trump could then declare that Iran’s nuclear programme had been sufficiently damaged and seek an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for partial sanctions relief and the postponement of further nuclear negotiations.
Parts of the facility are believed to lie between 80 and 100 metres underground, making it difficult to independently verify claims that it has been destroyed.
Iran’s military command, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, has warned that bombing the mountain would amount to a resumption of war across the region.
While Washington might hope to carry out a brief military campaign, Iran could seek to prolong the confrontation, calculating that a drawn-out conflict would increase the political and financial costs for Trump.
Scenario 3: Neither War nor Peace
Trump could also maintain the current approach: carrying out what he describes as defensive strikes, keeping the naval blockade in place and continuing to deploy the US Navy to escort commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, the status quo appears increasingly difficult to sustain. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in late October that the country needed to move beyond a situation of “neither war nor peace”.
Samii also questioned whether limited measures, such as occasional strikes against military facilities on Iranian islands, could continue indefinitely.
By mid-2027, he said, Washington’s attention would increasingly turn towards the 2028 presidential race. Candidates from both parties would have an incentive to seek a long-term solution to the Iran crisis rather than inherit an unresolved conflict.
Scenario 4: A Temporary Agreement
Diplomatically, a limited agreement mediated by Qatar remains another possibility. It could resemble the memorandum of understanding reached in June, which briefly halted the fighting and lifted the blockade before subsequently falling apart.
Financial markets appear to be factoring in the possibility of such an agreement. On November 4, the price of Brent crude fell below $100 a barrel.
Iran has offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within two days if Washington meets seven conditions. These include lifting the naval blockade, easing sanctions, guaranteeing an end to attacks and establishing a regional ceasefire that would also cover Lebanon.
A broader agreement addressing Iran’s nuclear programme appears more difficult to achieve. Washington wants verifiable commitments that Tehran will not rebuild the programme, while Iran insists that nuclear negotiations can begin only after its conditions have been met.
Modarres argued that diplomacy and military escalation are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
He suggested that both Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio could be potential contenders in the 2028 presidential election. According to Modarres, each would want to claim credit for any success while shifting responsibility for failures onto the other.
He described their approach as a “good cop, bad cop” strategy, keeping “a door half open” until the last possible moment — even after a war begins — so that Tehran would still have an opportunity to surrender.
Factors That Could Disrupt Any of These Scenarios
Several developments could undermine any of the four possible paths.
Israel could act unilaterally if it concludes that Washington is moving towards an agreement it opposes.
Within Iran, the failure of the June memorandum was partly attributed to hard-line factions that were directing attacks against commercial shipping. This illustrates how an agreement could be undermined in Tehran just as easily as in Washington.
Tehran is already interpreting the US midterm election results as confirmation of its position. Before the vote, analysts argued that Iran believed it was winning the war. A decisive Democratic victory could encourage Tehran to raise its demands and wait for Trump, now facing a weaker political position and fewer options, to encounter further difficulties.
And then there is Trump himself.
Asked on November 4 when the war with Iran would end, he gave the same answer he had offered on October 27: “Whenever I want.”
