The European Union has a problem that it can no longer afford to disguise as “consensus.”
It is called the veto.
Eleven EU member states—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and Sweden—have formally called for a rethink of the bloc’s unanimity system in foreign policy, arguing that national vetoes have increasingly prevented Europe from acting when speed and unity are most needed.
Their message to EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is blunt: consensus should produce common action, not paralysis.
And that distinction matters.
Because what is currently called “European unity” can sometimes look remarkably like 27 countries being held hostage by whichever government decides to say no.
One country should not be able to silence 26
Under the current system, foreign-policy decisions generally require unanimity.
That means a single member state can block a decision supported by the other 26.
The consequences have been painfully visible.
Hungary repeatedly used its veto during Viktor Orbán’s long tenure, including over EU measures concerning Russia and Ukraine. Earlier this year, Budapest blocked a €90 billion EU loan for Ukraine, turning a decision backed by the rest of the bloc into another bargaining chip.
This is precisely the problem the 11 governments are now challenging.
The EU wants to be a geopolitical power.
But how can Europe claim strategic autonomy when one government can pull the emergency brake every time the other 26 want to move?
Europe cannot simultaneously demand that its voice be heard globally while allowing its foreign policy to be routinely immobilized from within.
The veto was designed to protect states. It can now empower obstruction
The original logic behind unanimity is understandable.
Small states wanted protection.
Governments wanted guarantees that their vital national interests would not simply be overridden by larger countries.
But the system becomes dangerous when the veto stops being a last-resort safeguard and becomes a permanent instrument of political blackmail.
That is why the 11 countries are proposing stronger reliance on “sincere cooperation,” constructive abstention, and the possibility of using qualified-majority voting in selected foreign-policy areas.
They are not arguing that consensus should disappear.
They are arguing that consensus cannot become an excuse for doing nothing.
As their letter puts it, the EU can otherwise end up with legitimacy—but without strength.
And a geopolitical actor without the ability to act is not really a geopolitical actor.
France and Germany want Brussels to stop fighting itself
The dispute goes beyond voting rules.
France and Germany are also pushing for a major overhaul of the European External Action Service, seeking stronger coordination and a more effective foreign-policy structure.
The debate was at the center of discussions among EU foreign ministers in Ireland on September 1–2.
The Franco-German proposal would strengthen the role of Kaja Kallas while reorganizing parts of the EU’s diplomatic machinery and improving coordination with the European Commission.
In other words, Europe is finally confronting an embarrassing reality:
Its foreign-policy architecture is not built for the world it now inhabits.
Russia is waging war.
China is expanding its geopolitical influence.
The Middle East remains unstable.
Hybrid attacks are reaching EU territory.
And European governments are still arguing over who has the right to make Europe speak.
That is not strategic autonomy.
That is institutional paralysis.
And Kallas is warning: don’t take control away from member states
Kallas herself has pushed back against proposals that would transfer more authority from national governments to the European Commission.
Her concern is particularly relevant for smaller member states, which fear losing their direct influence over foreign-policy decisions if powers move too far toward the supranational level.
That creates the central contradiction in this entire debate.
Europe needs to become stronger and faster without becoming a system in which the largest countries simply dictate foreign policy to everyone else.
The challenge is therefore not simply:
“How do we get rid of the veto?”
It is:
“How do we stop the veto from being abused without destroying the protections it was designed to provide?”
That is the battle now unfolding in Brussels.
And the Balkans know exactly what a veto can do
For the Western Balkans, this debate is not theoretical.
It is personal.
The region has repeatedly learned that European integration can be delayed, distorted or blocked by disputes that have little to do with the actual readiness of candidate countries.
North Macedonia spent years trapped first by Greece’s veto over its name and later by Bulgaria’s veto over historical, linguistic and identity-related disputes.
Serbia’s accession process remains dependent on the unanimous consent of EU member states.
Montenegro has faced Croatian objections affecting its negotiating chapters.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has repeatedly encountered internal and external political blockages.
And Kosovo faces an even more fundamental obstacle: five EU member states still do not recognize its independence.
This means that Kosovo is pursuing a European future within a system in which some of the countries whose approval it ultimately needs do not even recognize the state seeking membership.
That is not merely a technical inconvenience.
It is a structural political problem.
What happens when European principles collide with national vetoes?
This is where the EU’s credibility is tested.
The European Union constantly tells the Western Balkans that reforms, rule of law, democracy and European values must come first.
Fair enough.
But the Union must also confront its own contradictions.
If the European project is supposed to be based on common values, how long can foreign-policy decisions remain vulnerable to the unilateral political calculations of one national government?
If 26 governments support a common position and one government blocks it, is that genuinely European foreign policy—or simply national foreign policy wearing a European flag?
The answer is becoming increasingly uncomfortable.
Europe cannot afford another decade of paralysis
The world is becoming faster, more dangerous and more competitive.
Europe’s rivals do not need 27 separate approvals before acting.
Russia does not wait for unanimous European agreement.
China does not.
Other geopolitical powers certainly do not.
Yet Europe repeatedly finds itself negotiating with itself before it can confront anyone else.
The 11-country initiative is therefore more than an institutional reform proposal.
It is an admission that the EU’s current decision-making system is failing the geopolitical reality around it.
And the timing is crucial.
The bloc cannot demand that candidate countries align with European foreign policy while European governments themselves remain capable of blocking that policy whenever it suits them.
For Kosovo and the Western Balkans, the stakes are enormous
A faster and more coherent EU foreign policy could mean a stronger European response to destabilizing actions in the Western Balkans.
It could make EU diplomacy more credible.
It could reduce the ability of individual governments to turn regional disputes into permanent bargaining chips.
And it could force the EU to confront the uncomfortable question of whether enlargement should remain vulnerable to bilateral vetoes indefinitely.
For Kosovo, this matters enormously.
Because when five EU member states refuse to recognize its independence, every discussion about European integration inevitably carries the shadow of the veto.
The EU cannot claim that its enlargement policy is purely merit-based while political disagreements between member states continue to determine how quickly—or whether—candidate countries can advance.
The era of “everyone must agree” may be reaching its breaking point
The EU has spent years celebrating consensus.
But consensus without action is just paralysis with better public relations.
The 11 governments are now challenging that model.
Their message is essentially this:
Europe can seek consensus—but it cannot allow consensus to become a weapon against Europe itself.
The veto was created as a shield.
It must not become a weapon.
Because if one government can repeatedly block 26 others, Europe does not have 27 foreign policies.
It has 26 governments waiting for the 27th to stop saying no.
And in today’s world, that is not unity.
That is weakness.
