Aleksandar Vučić is no longer talking only about Kosovo. His increasingly confrontational rhetoric comes as Serbia enters a potentially new political phase, marked by prolonged protests, growing student opposition, pressure for early elections and a president who has already signaled that he intends to leave the presidency before the next parliamentary vote.
Against that backdrop, Vučić’s remarks about potentially altering the course of the Ibar River should not be viewed simply as another statement about Kosovo. They are part of a political formula he has used for years: nationalism, fear, confrontation with the West and the portrayal of himself as Serbia’s indispensable defender.
His comments about the Ibar are among the most extreme examples of that rhetoric.
Vučić initially said Serbia had invited experts to examine the possibility of intervening in the river’s course. After strong reactions from the European Union, the United States and Germany, he did not retreat.
Instead, he shifted the debate from a concrete threat involving cross-border water infrastructure into a political attack on Brussels, accusing the EU of protecting what he described as its “Albanian servants.”
That matters.
When a leader faces mounting domestic pressure, he can choose to focus on the economy, corruption, institutions or reforms. Vučić is choosing a different path: Kosovo, the West and threats to Serbian interests.
Is this rhetoric aimed at the elections?
There are strong reasons to believe it is.
But it would be a mistake to assume that everything Vučić says is merely electoral propaganda.
Serbia appears to be moving toward early parliamentary elections, and Vučić has himself said they could be held within the coming months.
At the same time, he has indicated that he intends to leave the presidency before the elections, prompting speculation that he could eventually return to the position of prime minister while retaining significant political influence.
In other words, Vučić is not simply preparing for a campaign.
He is preparing for a potential transition of power.
And that is where the problem lies.
If elections are the moment when he needs to mobilize his political base, Kosovo remains one of the most powerful tools at his disposal.
Kosovo allows Vučić to construct a simple narrative:
Serbs are under pressure. Prishtina is acting against them. The West is tolerating Prishtina. And only Belgrade can protect Serbs.
That message is far easier to sell to a nationalist electorate than a debate over institutional accountability, economic performance or structural reforms.
But Serbia is no longer the Serbia of several years ago
This is the most significant change.
Student-led protests and broader civic mobilization following the Novi Sad railway station tragedy have substantially altered Serbia’s political landscape. The OSCE/ODIHR has described the political environment surrounding the upcoming electoral process as highly polarized following widespread civic mobilization and student protests.
More importantly, several surveys have suggested that a political force associated with the student movement could challenge or even surpass Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).
A CRTA and Stanford Democracy Action Lab poll published in July put a student-backed list at 44.9 percent among decided voters, compared with 35.7 percent for SNS.
If that trend is confirmed by additional polling and translated into an effective electoral organization, Vučić would face something he has not confronted in quite the same form before: an opponent that is not simply a traditional opposition party, but a civic movement capable of attracting voters across Serbia’s conventional political divisions.
That could help explain the escalation in rhetoric.
The more uncertain a political leader’s base becomes, the greater the temptation to emphasize an enemy.
The familiar populist formula
This is a classic feature of populist politics.
When a leader can no longer rely exclusively on the record of government, political conflict can be redirected from domestic issues toward an external threat.
For Vučić, the arsenal is familiar: Kosovo, the West, the EU, NATO, the opposition, “pressure on Serbia” and alleged persecution of Serbs.
His latest statements bring many of these themes together.
And this is where the Ibar enters the picture.
Technically, altering the course of a major river would be extraordinarily complicated and could have significant cross-border consequences. Serbian experts have reportedly questioned the proposal from a hydrotechnical perspective.
Politically, however, the Ibar is much easier to use than it would be to actually redirect.
Vučić does not need to change the river’s course to gain political benefit from talking about it.
He only needs to keep the issue in the headlines.
The formula is straightforward: the statement creates conflict, conflict generates attention, and attention shifts the public debate away from domestic problems.
The great paradox: Vučić is simultaneously working with the West and against it
This may be the most interesting aspect of his strategy.
In recent days, Vučić has hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Belgrade, discussed economic cooperation with Ukraine and reaffirmed Serbia’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
At the same time, he has attacked the EU over Kosovo.
The message is therefore deliberately dual.
Outside Serbia, Vučić can present himself as a pragmatic European partner. Inside Serbia, he can portray himself as the defender of national interests against Western pressure.
That allows him to preserve room for maneuver internationally while simultaneously mobilizing nationalist voters at home.
Is Vučić’s political era coming to an end?
This is where caution is necessary.
Saying that “Vučić is falling” would be premature.
He still controls a powerful political, administrative and media apparatus. SNS remains a major political force, and pro-government forces have continued to perform strongly in elections, even as their support has declined in some areas.
But it would be equally wrong to claim that Vučić’s system is untouchable.
For the first time in years, he faces a potentially dangerous combination of sustained protests, a crisis of public trust, new political competition and mounting pressure for early elections.
That is why the more accurate question is not whether Vučić’s rule is ending.
It is whether he is entering the next election from the position of an uncontested political leader — or from that of a leader who, for the first time in a long period, must fight seriously for his political survival.
Recent developments suggest that the second possibility can no longer be dismissed.
The Ibar is a symptom, not the cause
Seen in that context, the Ibar statement is more symptom than cause.
It reflects a leader raising the political temperature at a moment when he needs to maintain control ahead of a potentially consequential electoral contest.
If the Kosovo rhetoric were simply an element of foreign policy, Vučić could have backed away after strong reactions from the EU, the United States and Germany.
Instead, he used the international reaction as additional political material.
That is the logic of populism: the opponent is not necessarily a problem to be avoided; the opponent can become political capital.
For that reason, the statements about the Ibar, attacks on the EU and repeated focus on Kosovo should also be viewed as possible signals of a campaign that is already taking shape.
If early elections are indeed held within the coming months, Kosovo is likely to once again become one of the central themes of Vučić’s campaign.
