Russia’s far-right movement “Russian-Slavic Unification and Revival,” known as “Rusov,” has developed a network of links with political and extremist circles in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while individuals associated with the movement have also participated in the war in Ukraine.
One of the latest indications of these connections emerged in April 2026, when the Rusov Telegram channel published a photograph showing Velibor Zeković, a member of the Socialist Party of Srpska (SPS) in the Višegrad municipal assembly, posing alongside Željko Đurović with a Rusov flag near Višegrad.
Đurović previously presented himself as the head of the Serbian branch of the Russian-wide organization “Kosovo Front,” which Ukrainian authorities have identified as an entity linked to the movement of people from the Balkans to fight in Ukraine. In the photograph, Đurović is also wearing a Rusov insignia.
The photograph described Zeković and Đurović as “Serbian allies of the Rusov movement” and showed them standing near a memorial cross at a site where Russian volunteers fought alongside Serb forces during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s.
Neither Zeković nor the Socialist Party of Srpska responded to questions about the reported contacts with Rusov. Questions directed to Đurović and the Russian movement also went unanswered.
Balkan political ties to Russia’s far right
Journalist Đorđe Vujatović, who follows foreign influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, said such links are not isolated incidents.
“It is paradoxical that parties that are nominally called socialist flirt with right-wing organizations and have nothing to do with the ideology of the left,” Vujatović told Radio Free Europe.
He said political actors in Republika Srpska have maintained relationships with Russian far-right organizations for years, pointing to events attended by political officials where Alexander Zaldostanov, better known as “The Surgeon,” leader of Russia’s Night Wolves motorcycle club, has also appeared. Zaldostanov is under U.S. sanctions.
Vujatović argues that political opportunism is a major factor behind these relationships. Public opinion in Republika Srpska, he said, often responds positively to Russian political messages and Vladimir Putin’s policies, encouraging politicians to capitalize on historical ties with Russia, pan-Slavism and Orthodox Christianity.
For Russian organizations, meanwhile, the Balkans provide fertile ground for expanding influence because of the region’s historical and cultural connections with Russia.
From Bosnia to Ukraine
The location where Zeković and Đurović were photographed carries particular significance. It is associated with Russian volunteers who fought alongside forces of the Army of Republika Srpska during the Bosnian war.
Veterans’ organizations in Republika Srpska have for years marked a so-called “Day of Russian Volunteers.” This year, however, Bosnian authorities prevented several Russian volunteers from entering the country, with representatives of veterans’ organizations and relatives of Russian fighters attending the commemoration instead.
Among those denied entry was Alexander Kravchenko, a former Russian volunteer in Bosnia and founder of the “Kosovo Front,” an organization previously linked to Đurović.
The Kosovo Front was also active during the conflict in Donbas before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ukrainian authorities have described the organization as one of the structures involved in recruiting volunteers from the Balkans, an allegation Kravchenko has previously denied.
Vujatović said the links between Russian and Serbian actors do not necessarily represent an immediate major threat to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s internal security, but warned that insufficient scrutiny of citizens travelling to foreign battlefields remains a serious problem.
Bosnian citizens among Russian military formations
The exact number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who have travelled to fight in Ukraine remains unclear. Europol reported in 2025, however, that citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were among hundreds of identified members of Russia-linked mercenary formations Wagner and Redut.
One of the best-known figures is Davor Savičić, a Bosnian Serb who has reportedly held the rank of colonel within Russia’s Main Directorate of the General Staff, known as the GRU. Ukrainian authorities have opened criminal proceedings against him over alleged war crimes.
In early 2023, a video appeared on Telegram showing two masked men speaking Serbian and announcing that they had joined Russian forces in Ukraine, specifically the Sudoplatov Battalion.
Using the code names “Danube” and “Sava,” the men described themselves as Serbian “patriots and Russophiles” who had travelled to Ukraine to help their “Russian brothers.”
Their identities have never been officially confirmed, although investigative media in Bosnia and Herzegovina have reported that they were citizens of the country wanted by Interpol over criminal offenses.
The Rusov movement and its leader
The “Russian-Slavic Unification and Revival” movement was founded in 2012 and is led by Andrey Rodionov.
Its manifesto calls for the restoration of a “historical Great Russia,” which it describes as a defender of Slavic peoples, traditional values and a socially just society.
Following the outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the movement supported pro-Russian separatists. Rodionov has claimed that he established the Phoenix unit, which fought as part of the Prizrak Brigade, alongside volunteers from Serbia.
After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Rodionov published photographs of himself in military uniform and carrying weapons. He later claimed to have joined Russia’s Volunteer Assault Corps in 2023.
Rodionov has also spent years cultivating contacts in the Balkans.
Investigative media in North Macedonia reported that he visited the country several times from 2017 onward. In 2018, he organized a camp near Skopje where participants reportedly learned martial arts and were introduced to what organizers described as the “spiritual traditions of Ancient Russia.”
His connections in Serbia have been particularly significant.
Rodionov has maintained contacts with the unregistered far-right group “People’s Patrol,” known for its anti-migrant activities. In 2021, he and its leader, Damnjan Knežević, marked the centenary of the exodus of Russian monarchists following the Bolshevik Revolution in Belgrade. Knežević later travelled to Moscow, where he also met Rodionov.
Russian and Serbian symbols on the Donetsk front
Rusov has also developed links with the little-known Serbian far-right group “Srpski Soko” (“Serbian Falcon”).
In July 2024, the organization held a gathering in Novi Sad marking what it described as the “liberation of Srebrenica,” coinciding with the anniversary of the 1995 massacre and genocide committed by Bosnian Serb forces under Ratko Mladić.
Mladić was convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide and other crimes.
An even more direct connection between Srpski Soko and Rusov emerged in May 2025, when the Serbian organization published a photograph on Instagram showing Andrey Rodionov with three masked and armed men in military uniforms. Rusov and Srpski Soko flags were visible beside them, with the location identified as the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine.
“Russian comrades-in-arms with Serbian falcons on the front in defense of Orthodoxy,” the caption said.
The Rusov symbol — a yellow falcon bearing a solar-cross emblem — has also appeared at rallies in Belgrade organized by far-right groups in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The same symbol was visible in April 2026 near Višegrad, on the flag held by local official Velibor Zeković and Željko Đurović.
The evidence points to a network that has evolved over years, connecting Russian nationalist and far-right structures with political and extremist actors in the Balkans and, in some cases, with individuals who have travelled to the battlefield in Ukraine.
The growing overlap highlights how historical narratives, pan-Slavic ideology, Orthodox symbolism and pro-Russian politics continue to provide channels for Russia-linked far-right influence across parts of the Western Balkans.
