Over the past two years, several people in Kosovo have been arrested on suspicion of spying for Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency, BIA.
Taken together, the cases reveal a broad range of information that, according to Kosovo’s Special Prosecution, has allegedly been of interest to Serbian intelligence — from the Kosovo Police and Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) to political developments, elections, members of specific communities and influential individuals.
Some of the cases are still before the courts, while others have already resulted in convictions.
The cases do not, by themselves, prove the existence of a single coordinated BIA operation or network in Kosovo. But they raise questions about what the Serbian intelligence service seeks to obtain and how such information could potentially be used once acquired.
“Most of the work is focused on gaining people — either for information or for influence through institutions,” Dušan Janjić, founder of the Forum for Ethnic Relations in Belgrade, told Radio Free Europe.
One of the most recent cases is scheduled to enter trial proceedings on September 7 at the Basic Court in Prishtina.
Fatmir Sheholli has been charged with espionage and blackmail.
Kosovo’s Special Prosecution alleges that Sheholli was recruited by BIA and collected information about political developments, the security situation and the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.
According to the indictment, he was also allegedly involved in a plan to compromise Kosovo officials and interfere in the 2025 local elections.
Prosecutors say a photograph of a document titled “Top Secret 2” was found on his phone. The document allegedly outlined a plan to use Islam to divide Albanians and alter Western perceptions of Kosovo.
The authorship and authenticity of the document have not been publicly established.
The Islamic Community of Kosovo has rejected the claims contained in the document and called for an investigation into its origin and authenticity.
The publication of the document’s alleged contents triggered reactions and disputes on social media, including claims about links between BIA and members of Kosovo’s Muslim community.
But the indictments do not establish what happens to information that, according to prosecutors, is collected and passed on to Serbian intelligence.
Intelligence experts say that collecting information is only one part of an intelligence service’s work.
Just as important is who provides the information, what access that source has, and how the information and the network created around it could subsequently be used.
Daniel Lomas, a professor of intelligence and security at the University of Nottingham in England, said the first stage is generally the collection of information.
“Initially, you try to obtain information from sources — about a country’s politics, its economy, who is up and who is down, political rumors — by developing networks of people throughout society,” Lomas told Radio Free Europe.
But, he said, networks established for information gathering can later acquire another function: becoming tools for political influence.
What is BIA?
The Security Intelligence Agency, or BIA, is Serbia’s civilian national security and intelligence service and operates as a special organization of the Serbian government.
It was established by law in 2002, following the separation of civilian security and intelligence functions from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Under Serbian law, BIA’s responsibilities include protecting Serbia’s security, detecting and preventing activities aimed at undermining the constitutional order, and researching, collecting, processing and assessing intelligence relevant to the country’s security.
The law also allows BIA to cooperate with foreign intelligence services and international organizations in accordance with government directives and Serbia’s security and intelligence policy.
Radio Free Europe contacted BIA for comment on the cases and allegations concerning its activities in Kosovo but received no response.
In another case, Fehim Sali is suspected of collecting and passing information and documents about specific individuals in Kosovo during 2024 and 2025, including people whom prosecutors describe as members of Wahhabi circles.
Among those already convicted of espionage are Aleksandar Vlajić and Jelena Gjukanović.
Janjić said an intelligence service’s interest is not limited to documents or specific pieces of data. The people who have access to such information can be equally important.
According to him, BIA is interested in sources capable of providing information as well as individuals with influence.
“It is known who the majority population in Kosovo is — Albanians — and it is known who has influence in the economy,” Janjić said.
The objective, he added, is to reach “quality sources of information.”
But the importance of a source inside an institution is not necessarily limited to what that person can obtain.
Lomas uses the police as an example.
“Police can do more than an ordinary citizen can. They have different surveillance powers. They can have access to certain types of information,” he said.
A person inside the police, according to Lomas, could also help identify other people who might become recruitment targets or create opportunities for further operations.
What happens to the information?
Janjić is cautious when asked what specifically happens to information that reaches BIA.
“Honestly, I can only imagine,” he said.
In principle, he explained, information is passed to analytical departments, where it is “sorted and classified” and then used according to assessments, primarily political ones.
He cited blackmail and influence among the possible ways such information could be used.
Lomas explained the process from the broader perspective of how intelligence services operate.
Information about politics, institutions and individuals can show a foreign intelligence service where weaknesses or divisions exist within a government, political party or society.
“Intelligence allows you to open cracks within governments, political parties and wider society, because it gives you clear knowledge of how to exploit a particular society,” Lomas said.
The next step, he explained, can involve what the intelligence world calls “covert action” — moving beyond information gathering to taking action based on what has been learned.
“…so you’re no longer just standing back and collecting information, but also doing something based on it,” he said.
That does not mean the cases uncovered in Kosovo demonstrate the existence of such a coordinated BIA strategy.
The court proceedings concern the individual responsibility of specific defendants, while some of the prosecution’s allegations have yet to be established through final judgments.
Radio Free Europe asked Kosovo’s Special Prosecution about the number of people under investigation, indictment or trial for espionage on behalf of Serbia, possible links and common methods among the cases, and suspicions of involvement by people inside public institutions, but received no response.
The Kosovo Intelligence Agency also did not respond to questions about its assessment of the possible scope of BIA activity and the risk it could pose to Kosovo’s institutions.
Can espionage destabilize a country?
Lomas cautioned against concluding that espionage alone can destabilize a state.
“I think espionage only gets you so far,” he said.
Foreign intelligence services, he explained, do not necessarily need to create divisions or grievances within a society themselves. They can identify existing ones and exploit them.
To illustrate the mechanism, Lomas referred to Russia.
He cited debates over migration in Germany, stressing that concerns among parts of German society about migration were not created by Russia. But, he said, Russian actors have amplified such grievances, including through social media.
He compared the process to a fire: grievances already exist, while outside intervention can add “fuel to the fire,” making them larger and potentially more dangerous.
Lomas did not say that the cases in Kosovo demonstrate an identical model.
But in the Western Balkans, he sees the issue in the broader context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and its wider confrontation with the West.
According to him, Russia may have an interest in areas where existing tensions can be kept alive and NATO’s attention potentially diverted toward another crisis.
In Kosovo, the controversy surrounding the “Top Secret 2” document — whose authorship and authenticity remain unclear — demonstrated how quickly a sensitive issue can generate polarization.
For Janjić, information leaks, infiltration of institutions and attempts at influence cannot be viewed entirely separately.
He also links intelligence activity to Serbia’s policy of not recognizing Kosovo and to an interest in information that, in his view, could be used to discredit Kosovo.
“When you do not recognize Kosovo, then you have to collect as much negative information as possible about the situation there,” Janjić said.
How can Kosovo protect itself?
For Lomas, protection does not begin and end with identifying and arresting suspected agents.
One tool is publicly exposing the methods used by foreign intelligence services.
He points to the experience of Western European countries, where exposing espionage cases has also been used to increase public and institutional awareness of recruitment methods and the risks involved.
“The fact that you have had these arrests and that they have been made public is one way of making clear to people that these foreign intelligence services pose a threat. They are a risk. They are not going to disappear,” Lomas said.
Counterintelligence is equally important, he added: identifying people and institutions that may be particularly vulnerable, detecting recruitment attempts, and sharing information with international partners.
Janjić also emphasized the need to strengthen Kosovo’s intelligence and security capabilities.
But he said the responsibility does not rest solely with Kosovo’s institutions.
According to him, NATO, the United States and European partners have a role to play in raising security standards, strengthening Kosovo’s institutional capacities and developing better mechanisms for cooperation and intelligence sharing.
The cases uncovered so far, however, do not provide a clear answer about the possible scale of BIA activity in Kosovo.
It is not publicly known how many people may have been recruited, how long their links to Serbian intelligence may have lasted, or how much information may have reached the agency.
For some of those accused, the prosecution’s allegations themselves still have to be tested in court.
