Serbia’s government seems increasingly reluctant to fully commit to EU membership, while still seeking financial support—specifically €1.6 billion from the EU’s Growth Plan. This presents a major problem, as the European Parliament is asking the European Commission for a clear explanation of why €100 million was already disbursed to a country with democratic deficiencies.
At a pre-election rally for local assembly candidates, President Aleksandar Vučić told the audience that Serbia remains on the EU path, citing “peace, security, and stability” as his achievements. The crowd applauded, and Vučić avoided discussing more sensitive issues, such as the European Parliament’s critique of his government’s use of excessive force, arbitrary arrests, persecution, and intimidation. Special EP rapporteur Tonino Picula explicitly called for abandoning “stabilocracy,” noting that prioritizing stability over genuine reforms has failed to transform the country.
Vučić’s response was a typical rhetorical flourish, saying that “while Picula speaks badly about me, I know I am doing good for my people,” signaling either detachment from reality or an intent to step away from the EU path. This raises questions about whether Serbia might follow Georgia’s example, which voluntarily halted its EU accession process after the EU insisted that free elections and a shift from authoritarian policies were prerequisites.
Unlike Georgia, Serbia’s leadership is unlikely to openly withdraw from negotiations. Instead, it seeks to maintain appearances while avoiding substantive reforms, particularly in combating high-level corruption. Laws introduced by the ruling party (referred to as the “Mrdić laws”) are seen as tools to control the judiciary and protect government officials from prosecution, directly undermining EU conditions.
When European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos expressed serious concerns over Serbia’s judicial reforms and warned that financial aid could be withheld, the Serbian government largely ignored her. Prime Minister Ana Brnabić attempted to downplay the issue, presenting a conciliatory image, while state-controlled media avoided reporting Kos’s warning that EU funding is conditioned on respect for democratic mechanisms, free and fair elections, pluralistic media, independent judiciary, and human rights compliance.
The ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) is unlikely to take Georgia’s step of explicitly rejecting EU funds or accession discussions. Their approach prioritizes short-term financial and political gain, exemplified by the Vučić–Rama proposal allowing Western Balkans countries access to the EU single market and Schengen area without voting rights—essentially bypassing membership obligations.
Tatjana Pašić of the Freedom and Justice Party criticized Vučić for undermining Serbia’s original EU application from 2012, calling the proposal with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama a unilateral move that contradicts the 2013 National Assembly resolution and risks diverting Serbia from its EU path.
According to Vladimir Međak, vice president of the European Movement in Serbia, the government’s strategy is mainly a time-buying tactic: by delaying or complicating EU enlargement, Serbia can later claim that other Western Balkans countries failed to join due to their own leaderships’ shortcomings. Montenegro’s potential accession is a key factor; if Montenegro joins, it proves enlargement is possible, putting pressure on other regional governments.
Meanwhile, extreme right-wing voices, like Alice Weidel of Germany’s Alternative for Germany party, have pushed for Serbia to strengthen itself “without political tutelage,” though in the European Parliament, such views remain a minority.
In essence, Serbia risks following a path similar to Georgia: maintaining EU rhetoric while avoiding genuine reform, prioritizing short-term political gains, and using EU processes as leverage rather than as a framework for democratic transformation.
