Serbia remains the main destabilizing factor in the Western Balkans, while President Aleksandar Vučić has become highly skilled at using nationalist rhetoric and propaganda to maintain political influence, German expert Alexander Rhotert argues in an analysis published by Switzerland’s Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ).
In the analysis, titled “The Balkans Remain a Neglected Problem Region, Serbia Remains the Main Destabilizing Factor,” Rhotert warns that despite the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East dominating international attention, lasting peace and stability have still not been fully secured in the Western Balkans.
According to Rhotert, an aggressive form of Serbian nationalism remains one of the region’s most significant sources of instability. He argues that the long-term objective of uniting territories of the former Yugoslavia inhabited by Serbs into a single political entity continues to influence parts of the political establishment in Belgrade.
Rhotert describes this as a decades-long political project pursued not only through military means, but also through propaganda, diplomacy and partnerships with Russia and China.
He points to statements by Aleksandar Vulin, whom he describes as one of Vučić’s ideological mentors. Vulin has previously said that the realization of the concept of a “Serbian world” could take years or even decades.
For Rhotert, such statements demonstrate a long-term strategic perspective in Belgrade that contrasts with the shorter political cycles of Western democracies.
Vučić and the politics of propaganda
Rhotert singles out Vučić as a particularly effective practitioner of political messaging, arguing that the Serbian president “perfectly masters the repertoire of incitement and propaganda.”
The analysis also recalls Vučić’s political past as Serbia’s information minister under Slobodan Milošević between 1998 and 2000.
Rhotert argues that Vučić’s current political style cannot be separated entirely from that period, despite his efforts to present Serbia as a country committed to European integration.
The author also criticizes what he describes as Belgrade’s strategy of promoting a “package solution” for EU enlargement, under which all Western Balkan countries would join the European Union together.
He argues that such an approach could allow Serbia to use the progress of its neighbors as leverage over Brussels.
If Serbia and Republika Srpska continue moving toward authoritarianism while Belgrade experiences further setbacks in the rule of law, media freedom and the fight against corruption, Rhotert argues, a collective accession process could allow Vučić to avoid implementing difficult reforms while effectively holding the region back.
Dodik and the threat to Bosnia and Herzegovina
The analysis devotes particular attention to Milorad Dodik and his Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD).
Rhotert argues that Dodik and his party have deliberately obstructed Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress toward EU membership.
According to the analysis, this could cost the country more than €1 billion in funding under the EU Growth Plan, while political obstruction has also affected the appointment of a coordinator for IPA funds.
“Dodik’s plan is to destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state — if this cannot be achieved militarily, then through other means,” Rhotert writes.
He warns that an attempt to separate Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina would be unlikely to take place peacefully, highlighting the importance of EU and NATO security deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
For Rhotert, the region’s current political tensions cannot be understood without considering the experience of the Yugoslav wars.
From the SANU Memorandum to today
Rhotert traces some of the ideological roots of the region’s conflicts to the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), which he describes as one of the developments that helped set the stage for the eventual collapse of Yugoslavia.
According to the analysis, the document contributed to a new nationalist political discourse, including claims of a demographic “genocide” against Serbs in Kosovo and demands for changes to Yugoslavia’s 1974 constitutional order.
The wars of the 1990s subsequently left around 140,000 people dead and millions displaced.
Rhotert argues that elements of the same political narratives continue to appear in Serbia today.
As an example, he cites statements attributed to Serbian minister Snežana Paunović, who, according to the author, said that if she had been in Milošević’s position in 1998, she would have carried out the “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo and compared Albanians to “termites.”
Rhotert characterizes such rhetoric as explicit hate speech and argues that similar language remains present in parts of Serbia’s pro-government media environment.
Serbia and the legacy of war crimes
The analysis also criticizes Belgrade for continuing to provide refuge to individuals convicted of war crimes.
Rhotert highlights the case of General Novak Đukić, who was convicted over his responsibility for the 1995 Kapija massacre in Tuzla, where an artillery shell killed 71 people and wounded around 200 others.
According to Rhotert, Đukić currently lives freely in Belgrade.
The issue, the author argues, demonstrates the gap between Serbia’s formal commitment to European integration and its handling of the legacy of the wars of the 1990s.
Serbia’s missed democratic path
Rhotert also points to the period immediately after Milošević’s fall as evidence that Serbia was capable of pursuing a different political direction.
He highlights the government of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić and the extradition of Milošević to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as one of Đinđić’s most consequential decisions.
Đinđić was assassinated in 2003 by individuals linked to structures associated with Serbia’s old security and criminal networks.
According to Rhotert, the rise of Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) to power in 2012 marked a return of political figures associated with the Milošević era and nationalist circles to positions of influence.
A warning to Brussels
Rhotert ultimately calls on the European Union to adopt a clearer and more demanding approach toward the Serbian government.
He argues that Serbia should not be allowed to obstruct or condition the European aspirations of neighboring countries.
For the author, the EU should distinguish between the Serbian government and Serbian citizens who have spent years protesting against what he describes as a controlled democracy under the political successor to Milošević.
The broader warning is that European engagement with Belgrade cannot be based solely on Serbia’s formal commitment to EU membership.
If nationalist narratives, authoritarian tendencies and obstruction of neighboring countries continue, Rhotert argues, Brussels risks treating a source of regional instability as though it were simply another candidate for gradual integration.
The challenge for the EU, therefore, is not whether Serbia should eventually become part of Europe, but whether Belgrade is prepared to meet the political and democratic standards that membership requires.
