Modern warfare is no longer confined to battlefields, tanks, missiles and conventional armies. Technological advances have created another, less visible front with significant potential to influence political stability, national security and democratic societies. This front extends across smartphones, social media and digital platforms, where fabricated content can spread rapidly and shape public perceptions of politics, security and international relations.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming how information is produced, processed and distributed, creating new opportunities for technological development but also for manipulation, propaganda and interference in democratic processes. Russia, China and other state and non-state actors have faced allegations of conducting influence operations, some of which have been supported by documented evidence. In the Western Balkans, a particularly sensitive dimension of this information contest involves political and media narratives originating in Serbia, especially those concerning Kosovo, interethnic relations and security.
Democratic societies increasingly face a complex challenge: ensuring access to information is no longer enough. It is also necessary to determine which information is authentic, which has been manipulated and which has been deliberately created to influence public opinion. The challenge becomes even greater when fabricated content is mixed with real events, political statements and existing tensions, blurring the line between facts and their interpretation.
In the past, organizing a propaganda campaign required substantial resources, extensive structures and control over traditional media such as newspapers, radio and television. Today, artificial intelligence can help produce a fabricated video, manipulated photograph or false statement in a short time and distribute it to large audiences without the infrastructure once required by traditional media operations. A politician can be portrayed as saying something they never said, an event that never happened can be illustrated with convincing images, and coordinated networks of accounts can circulate false information to create the impression that it has been independently confirmed.
This is one of the most concerning aspects of modern information warfare: technology is no longer used only to spread propaganda but can also manufacture what audiences perceive as evidence. Distinguishing reality from manipulation becomes particularly difficult during elections, political crises, protests and armed conflicts, when information spreads rapidly and public reactions often precede verification.
Hybrid warfare combines military and non-military instruments to exert pressure on a state or society. These may include cyberattacks, sabotage, economic pressure, intelligence operations and information manipulation, deployed as part of a broader strategy. Within this framework, disinformation plays a distinctive role. Rather than physically damaging infrastructure or directly weakening state capabilities, it seeks to influence how citizens understand events and make decisions.
Information operations do not necessarily change events themselves; instead, they seek to change how those events are interpreted. Their objective is to shape perceptions, undermine trust and influence public attitudes. In some cases, a disinformation campaign does not need to persuade people to believe a particular lie. It may be enough to make them doubt every source of information they encounter.
When photographs can be dismissed as manipulated, videos labelled fabricated and journalistic reporting denounced as propaganda, even documented facts may struggle to gain public trust. The threat therefore extends beyond fake news: it undermines society’s ability to establish a shared understanding of reality and conduct public debate based on verifiable evidence.
AI and the growing sophistication of influence operations
Reports from European institutions and technology companies indicate that information manipulation operations have become increasingly sophisticated, organized and difficult to detect.
In its fourth report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), published in March 2026, the European External Action Service (EEAS) found that these operations had reached new levels of complexity and international reach during 2025. The findings suggest that information manipulation can no longer be treated merely as a communications problem or the ordinary spread of false news.
According to the report, information interference has become part of a broader hybrid toolkit in which digital activities can be combined with political pressure, threats and destabilizing actions to achieve strategic objectives. A disinformation operation may therefore be part of a wider effort to weaken institutions, deepen social divisions or influence a country’s political orientation.
Russia is among the most extensively documented examples of the use of information influence operations to advance geopolitical objectives. Since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, networks linked to Russian interests have been identified in campaigns seeking to discredit Ukraine, weaken Western support for Kyiv and deepen political divisions within democratic societies.
These operations go beyond promoting narratives favourable to Moscow. They also seek to undermine confidence in Western institutions and influence how audiences interpret international developments.
The EEAS’s third report, published in March 2025, identified digital infrastructure used by foreign actors, primarily from Russia and China, to interfere in the information environment of the European Union and partner countries. Documented methods included websites impersonating established news outlets, fake social media profiles and coordinated distribution of content designed to resemble independent reporting.
Artificial intelligence expands these capabilities by enabling the production of large volumes of content in different languages, tailoring messages to particular audiences and distributing them with fewer resources. A single narrative can be adapted to different social groups, creating the appearance of a broad, spontaneous debate even when the content originates from a coordinated operation.
During the 2024 US presidential election, Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center documented influence attempts by actors linked to Russia, Iran and China. These included fabricated videos, AI-generated content and cyber operations targeting the election information environment. Such cases do not establish that foreign interference determined the election outcome, but they demonstrate how digital manipulation has become a tool for influencing political debate and public perceptions.
Another concern is the use of AI to imitate the identity and authority of real people. Deepfake technology can generate convincing videos and audio recordings portraying individuals saying or doing things that never happened. In politically polarized environments, such material can trigger immediate reactions before its authenticity is established.
The danger, however, lies not only in the fabrication of evidence. The growing circulation of AI-generated material can also allow individuals or institutions to dismiss authentic evidence by claiming it has been manipulated. This phenomenon, known in disinformation research as the “liar’s dividend,” gives people an opportunity to evade accountability by exploiting public uncertainty about the authenticity of digital material.
Information manipulation can consequently operate in two directions at once: making falsehoods appear credible while casting doubt on the truth. This presents a serious challenge for journalism, public institutions and democratic debate.
Automation strengthens the process. AI-assisted influence networks can generate thousands of variations of the same narrative and adapt them to different languages, cultures and public concerns. An OpenAI report published in February 2026 on malicious uses of artificial intelligence found that threat actors typically combine AI models with traditional tools, including websites and social media accounts. Their operations can span multiple platforms and use different technological systems.
AI has not replaced traditional propaganda; rather, it has accelerated and expanded it. However, the mass production of content does not automatically translate into mass influence. Security assessments must distinguish between attempts to manipulate, the distribution of content and demonstrable effects on citizens’ behaviour.
China represents another dimension of digital competition. Reports by Microsoft and the EEAS have identified operations linked to Chinese actors that seek to influence international perceptions, exploit social polarization and promote narratives aligned with Beijing’s strategic interests. Although the methods and objectives of these operations differ from those associated with Russia, both illustrate how the information environment has become an arena of strategic competition between major powers.
Why the Western Balkans is particularly vulnerable
These developments are especially relevant to the Western Balkans, where ethnic tensions, political disputes, external influences and debates over Euro-Atlantic integration continue to shape the regional environment.
In such circumstances, a fabricated statement by an official, a manipulated video of a protest or false information about a security incident can create uncertainty and provoke public reactions before the facts are verified.
A particularly sensitive dimension concerns relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Political disagreements, interethnic tensions and security concerns create an environment in which disinformation can spread and influence how events are understood by local and international audiences.
Information in this context does more than report developments on the ground. It can also be used to shape perceptions of political responsibility, institutional legitimacy and regional stability.
Research published in 2026 indicates that narratives originating from Serbian and Russian sources remain an important part of Kosovo’s information environment. These narratives frequently focus on interethnic relations, the security of the Serb community, the actions of Kosovo’s institutions and the role of international actors.
The way such claims are presented can create the impression of a wider crisis than the available verified evidence supports. This does not mean that every concern raised by Belgrade or representatives of the Serb community constitutes disinformation. Rather, individual claims must be assessed against the evidence and the context in which they are made.
One significant study was published on March 27, 2026, by BIRN Kosovo and Internews Kosovo under the title Mapping Disinformation: Russian and Serbian Narratives in the Media and Social Networks in Kosovo.
The study examined how misleading narratives, primarily originating from Russian and Serbian sources, exploit interethnic tensions, fuel uncertainty and weaken social cohesion. Researchers monitored four Kremlin-controlled media outlets that published 1,323 items about Kosovo between September 2025 and February 2026. They also examined 150 platforms and social media accounts, identifying more than 20,000 suspicious links. Of the collected material, 2,361 articles were selected for in-depth analysis.
These figures point to an information environment in which influence is not limited to an isolated political statement or a single false report. Instead, similar narratives can be reproduced across an ecosystem of media outlets, platforms and accounts. When a claim is repeated by numerous sources, it can gain visibility and credibility even if those sources provide no independent evidence to substantiate it.
The dispute over Kosovo’s Law on Foreigners
One example from 2026 concerns the debate over Kosovo’s Law on Foreigners, which became part of the political and information confrontation between Prishtina and Belgrade.
During a United Nations Security Council meeting on April 9, Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Đurić made claims about arbitrary arrests, institutional pressure and the displacement of Serbs from Kosovo. Russian representative Vassily Nebenzia accused Kosovo’s institutions of pursuing policies that, in his assessment, amounted to ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanian population in the north.
In an analysis published on May 6, BIRN journalists at Prishtina Insight argued that these claims relied on recurring narratives and that portraying the Law on Foreigners as an instrument for expelling Serbs did not accurately reflect the administrative nature of the legal measures.
The significance of the case also lies in how statements made at an international forum were subsequently reproduced in Serbian media. According to BIRN’s research, Serbia’s public broadcaster RTS and other outlets, including Pink.rs, gave prominence to claims about the displacement of Serbs and continued pressure on the community.
In this way, a political interpretation presented at the Security Council can become a recurring media narrative, influencing audiences in Serbia, the Serb community in Kosovo and international observers who may have limited direct knowledge of the situation on the ground.
Security narratives and manipulated visual content
Another example concerns the portrayal of military cooperation and security developments in the region by some Serbian and Russian media outlets.
In February 2026, fact-checking platform The Geopost analysed reports that framed military cooperation between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia through threatening interpretations directed at Serbia. In other cases documented during August, outlets such as Sputnik and RT Balkan used alarmist language when reporting developments in northern Kosovo, including property issues around the Ujman reservoir and the situation near the bridge over the Ibër River.
These examples illustrate how administrative, political or security developments can be presented in ways that reinforce the perception of a continuous threat.
The risks increase when such narratives are combined with manipulated visual material. In September 2026, The Geopost identified an Instagram post in which footage from Prishtina was falsely presented as showing movement towards North Mitrovica.
In an environment where inaccurate information can aggravate interethnic tensions, changing the context of a video can create the impression of a new security development even when the footage does not substantiate the claim being made.
This case does not establish that artificial intelligence was used. It does, however, demonstrate that manipulating the context of authentic images remains an important disinformation technique—one that emerging technologies could make even more convincing.
AI-generated disinformation in Kosovo’s electoral environment
The use of artificial intelligence in Kosovo’s information environment is no longer merely a theoretical possibility.
In an analysis published in April 2026, the European Union Office in Kosovo referred to a report by Hibrid.info on disinformation during the electoral processes of late 2025. The analysis highlighted the circulation of fake news, fabricated opinion polls and unverified statements, alongside an increase in AI-generated content.
The report also identified narratives circulated by Serbian- and Russian-language media seeking to influence public debate, intensify polarization and question the legitimacy of Kosovo’s institutions.
Monitoring conducted by the organization Sbunker for January–March 2026 likewise identified an intensification of disinformation, increasingly sophisticated manipulation techniques, a rise in propaganda on Telegram and the emergence of misleading AI-generated content. According to the monitoring, emotionally charged and divisive language was another characteristic of content designed to influence public debate.
These developments suggest that Kosovo’s challenge is not simply to counter a particular political narrative originating in Serbia or Russia. It must also develop the capacity to identify how manipulative content is produced, distributed and amplified.
In an information environment where political statements can be repeated by numerous outlets, authentic images can be stripped of their context and AI can produce convincing-looking material, fact-checking becomes an important component of democratic security.
At the same time, it is essential to distinguish between political propaganda, biased reporting, documented disinformation and coordinated influence operations. The fact that a narrative is circulated by Serbian or Russian media does not automatically prove that it was produced by a state institution or forms part of an organized operation. Such conclusions require evidence concerning its origin, coordination, purpose and distribution mechanisms.
Relations between Serbia and Kosovo illustrate how political conflicts and unresolved disputes can extend into the information sphere. The contest is not only about events on the ground, but also about how those events are interpreted. As AI develops, this contest may become more complex because the ability to produce and distribute convincing content is advancing faster than the verification capacities of many institutions and newsrooms.
Journalism and public trust as the first line of defence
This distinction is particularly important for journalism, which faces growing responsibilities in the age of artificial intelligence.
Journalists can no longer rely solely on a photograph appearing authentic, a voice sounding convincing or information being published by numerous websites. All these elements can be reproduced or manipulated through technology.
For Kosovo, protection against information manipulation is not simply a matter of responding to external propaganda. It also requires strengthening independent journalism, institutional transparency and public trust.
When false information can spread within minutes while verification requires time and evidence, protecting the credibility of facts becomes just as important as identifying the source of manipulation.
The central challenge is therefore not only to expose false narratives, but to build an information environment in which claims are assessed critically, evidence is made accessible and public debate remains grounded in verifiable facts.
