A political analysis published by Radar examines the electoral mathematics surrounding Serbia’s October 25 parliamentary elections, arguing that the distribution of votes among opposition parties could be as important as the overall vote share of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).
Written by Milivoje Karadžić, a master’s student of electrical engineering in Belgrade, the analysis argues that President Aleksandar Vučić does not necessarily need to secure 50 percent of the vote for the SNS to obtain a parliamentary majority. Instead, it focuses on the potential impact of votes cast for parties that fail to cross the electoral threshold and therefore do not directly translate into parliamentary seats.
The role of the D’Hondt system
Under Serbia’s proportional electoral system, parliamentary seats are allocated using the D’Hondt method. Karadžić argues that this can make the distribution of votes among parties particularly consequential when several lists remain below the threshold.
As an example, the analysis considers a hypothetical scenario in which the SNS receives around 42–43 percent of the vote, while a student-backed list receives around 40 percent and another opposition list receives 2.9 percent—just below the threshold.
According to the analysis, the votes cast for the sub-threshold list would not disappear politically, but they would not directly produce parliamentary seats. The seats associated with those votes would instead be redistributed among lists that qualify for the allocation of mandates.
Karadžić argues that if several lists remain below the threshold, the number of votes excluded from the seat allocation increases, potentially benefiting the largest parties.
A divided opposition
The analysis identifies a fragmented opposition as a scenario that could affect the distribution of parliamentary seats. It describes a potential electoral landscape involving a student-backed list alongside several other opposition groupings, including pro-European, conservative and right-wing parties.
The author argues that the SNS would not necessarily need to defeat every opposition list outright. Instead, the analysis says that having one or more opposition lists remain below the threshold could reduce the number of mandates available to the opposition as a whole.
Karadžić also argues that the SNS could seek to form a parliamentary majority after the election through cooperation with established political partners and smaller parties.
Among the potential partners mentioned are the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), led by Ivica Dačić, as well as the coalition associated with Miša Vacić and Miloš Vulin. The analysis also considers the possibility that individual MPs elected on other lists could eventually support a government majority.
These are scenarios presented by the author rather than established post-election outcomes.
Student list and the race for first place
A central part of the analysis is the possibility that a student-backed list could finish ahead of the SNS. Karadžić argues that this would have political significance beyond the raw difference in vote share because it could alter the broader perception of the election and affect coalition negotiations.
The article also examines the possibility of opposition parties withdrawing in favor of the student-backed list. According to Karadžić, such a move could both strengthen the student list in a direct contest with the SNS and reduce the number of opposition votes that might otherwise remain below the threshold.
The analysis presents this as a tactical argument for opposition coordination rather than as a prediction of the election result.
Why the presidential election matters
Karadžić also links the timing of the parliamentary election to the presidential election expected in 2027.
The analysis argues that the presidential contest could present different electoral dynamics because Serbia’s presidential election uses a two-round system, meaning that a candidate must ultimately secure more than half of the votes cast in the decisive round.
Karadžić contends that Vučić therefore has an interest in securing a stable parliamentary majority before the presidential contest. The analysis does not establish this as Vučić’s stated motivation, but presents it as the author’s interpretation of the political timetable.
Ultimately, the Radar analysis argues that the October 25 election will not be determined solely by the percentage of votes won by individual parties. Under the proportional system, the number of votes received by parties that fail to enter the parliamentary distribution can also affect how mandates are divided among the qualifying lists.
