On Sunday, both the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the student movement are expected to declare victory. Here is what could happen if Aleksandar Vučić claims victory first. According to various predictions, Serbia could face chaos and possibly violence, regardless of the election outcome.
The central question surrounding Sunday’s elections in Serbia is not who will win, but who will get ahead of their opponent and declare victory first. Both Aleksandar Vučić and the students are confident of winning, with the difference being that Vučić has more mechanisms at his disposal to manipulate the process and commit electoral fraud.
His opponents are convinced that Vučić will rig the elections. They claim that he has already secured more than 100,000 votes from what they describe as the regional diaspora, including voters in Republika Srpska, Montenegro, and Kosovo. They also allege that his supporters could resort to “multiple voting.”
What follows could be turmoil and chaos, potentially returning Serbia to the kind of politics established in Yugoslavia from the mid-1980s onward.
Vučić will most likely declare victory regardless of the actual result, while the students and other opponents will refuse to recognize it. They, too, could declare themselves the winners, reflecting the current climate in Serbian society and public opinion. Such a confrontation could bring Serbia to the brink of civil conflict.
Imagine Vučić announcing victory, students flooding the streets, and police moving to confront them. Now imagine the opposite scenario: Vučić loses, but his repressive apparatus refuses to relinquish power.
Two scenarios, the same threat of bloodshed.
Whoever wins, Serbia could wake up the following morning amid police batons, tear gas, and bloodshed.
But the students are unlikely to surrender or abandon what they believe is their victory. They have not spent two years protesting only to accept defeat quietly now.
For that reason, the possibility of a “revolution” cannot be ruled out. If that happens, anything could become possible in Serbia.
Both sides will fight to defend their positions, knowing that the victors may show little mercy to the defeated.
According to various predictions, Serbia could face chaos after the elections, regardless of the outcome, potentially accompanied by violence of varying intensity.
This could mark the culmination of years of Serbian politics. The cycle would come full circle, with disorder returning to where it began.
Much of Serbian public opinion fears that the country could descend into a prolonged crisis and confrontation, precisely because neither Vučić nor the student movement appears willing to compromise.
It is difficult to imagine either side accepting defeat peacefully in such a polarized society, which, ironically, holds remarkably similar positions on many issues.
This is particularly true regarding regional policy, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Republika Srpska; relations with Europe, where most people do not support EU membership; and Russia, given that the students also oppose imposing sanctions on Moscow.
What Scenario Could Unfold?
In short, the outlook is ominous. Much will depend on the police and the military.
Conflicting Polls
It is conceivable that both sides will declare victory before the official results are announced, with recent opinion polls reportedly suggesting a very close contest.
Some projections suggest that Aleksandar Vučić’s list could receive 45% of the vote, while other polls indicate that the student-backed list could secure the same share.
For the students to win, voter turnout would reportedly need to reach at least 65%.
So what can be expected when both sides are convinced that victory is within their reach?
Aleksandar Vučić will not relinquish power easily. He is unlikely to recognize or accept defeat, let alone hand over control of the government.
For him and his associates, the elections represent a matter of survival, political existence, and even personal freedom, particularly as they face the prospect of imprisonment.
In effect, these elections amount to a referendum on Aleksandar Vučić.
Once either side declares victory, the current atmosphere suggests that the streets of Belgrade, and possibly other cities, particularly Novi Sad, could fill with demonstrators. Novi Sad was the starting point of what has become known as the “revolution against Vučić.”
The students could either celebrate their victory or protest what they would regard as electoral theft by Vučić, a possibility they have already warned about.
Such an outcome cannot be ruled out because, as noted, Vučić has shown no intention of relinquishing power, particularly not peacefully.
The key question, therefore, is how the repressive apparatus, which currently appears to support the regime, will position itself.
If Vučić declares victory, protests could escalate and become more radical.
This raises the question of whether the students would be prepared to launch a desperate assault on the strongholds of Vučić’s power, from political institutions to media organizations.
Would Vučić opt for a Serbian version of Tiananmen Square, as some members of his increasingly radical network of loyalists are allegedly urging him to do in order to protect the lucrative positions they have acquired under his rule?
Ultimately, much will depend on the position taken by the security apparatus and which side it chooses to support.
Will these repressive and paramilitary-aligned structures remain loyal to Vučić, and for how long?
It is worth remembering that such structures quickly turned their backs on Slobodan Milošević as well.
And what happens then?
That is precisely the dilemma.
If the streets of Belgrade fill with demonstrators, the question becomes how Vučić will respond.
More specifically, how will the gendarmerie, special police units, military, and the alleged mercenary paramilitary groups said by some Serbian analysts to be on standby react?
Will they risk their lives for Vučić, or will they act as they did when they turned against Milošević?
One crucial historical factor should not be overlooked: when Milošević was losing power, the United States and the European Union supported the process and stood firmly behind the opposition.
If Vučić wins, or simply declares victory, his position could become extremely fragile, assuming he manages to form a government at all.
To remain in power, he would have to resort to methods associated with Vladimir Putin’s style of governance, something that would be unlikely to please Brussels, which has appeared remarkably indifferent to the Serbian elections.
Indeed, to some extent, Brussels seems to lean toward Vučić, whom the author characterizes as openly anti-European.
On the other hand, it remains unclear what a student victory would bring beyond the departure of what the author describes as Vučić’s pathological autocracy.
The students’ central agenda has been to remove Vučić from power and implement lustration, a process of excluding individuals implicated in abuses under a previous political system from public office. However, questions remain about whether they have sufficient logistical capacity to achieve these goals.
Who controls the institutions responsible for implementing such measures, particularly the police and judiciary, which the author argues are firmly under Vučić’s control?
Of course, this situation could also change very quickly.
In the Balkans, political allegiances and positions can shift rapidly, often depending on the direction of the prevailing political winds.
Could Vučić Flee Serbia?
There is another possible scenario if the students win by a substantial margin, as they claimed could happen during their latest pre-election rally on Thursday, which reportedly attracted more than 200,000 people.
That scenario is Vučić’s flight from the country.
He understands that he could face accountability for numerous matters, which may give him and his associates even greater motivation to resist relinquishing power.
They know that imprisonment could await them.
Therefore, the possibility cannot be ruled out that a Russian Antonov transport aircraft, fully loaded and waiting on a remote section of the runway at Batajnica Airport, could be ready to take him to a safer refuge in Minsk or Moscow.
In other words, anything could happen in Serbia from Monday onward.
All options remain open, although the most troubling scenarios are among those being discussed.
Why Serbia’s Elections Matter Beyond Its Borders
The elections in Belgrade and their consequences could be felt far beyond Serbia’s borders.
The European Union is concerned that Serbia represents a vulnerable point in Europe’s security architecture in the Balkans, providing a broader area in which Russia could exert considerable pressure.
Student activists and their supporters are disappointed by what they perceive as the EU’s indifference toward their political struggle.
At the same time, they face a widespread perception abroad that democracy in Serbia is a lost cause.
On Sunday, they intend to demonstrate that such assessments are wrong.
