A major institutional scandal has erupted over the controversial “Mrdić Laws” reshaping Serbia’s judiciary, with independent legal experts revealing that the government allegedly submitted a completely different version of the text to the Venice Commission than the one currently introduced to the Serbian Parliament.
While the ruling coalition insists that any discrepancies are a fictional fabrication, comparing the public records of the Venice Commission with the documentation on the Serbian Ministry of Justice website reveals critical structural differences regarding hierarchy, accountability, and political control.
The Bait-and-Switch: The Five-Prosecutor Commission Discrepancy
At the heart of the scandal is a fundamental mechanism governing how much control senior state prosecutors hold over sensitive, independent investigations (such as the ongoing Novi Sad structural collapse and corruption probes).
- The English Version (Sent to Strasbourg): The draft reviewed by the Venice Commission mid-May outlined a protective appeal system where a panel of five independent public prosecutors from any arbitrary level would rule on disputes regarding mandatory instructions from superiors.
- The Serbian Version (Presented to Parliament): Documents submitted to the Parliament later on June 4, however, introduced a highly strict hierarchical enforcement loop. The panel was altered to consist exclusively of prosecutors who are directly superior to one another (reintroducing Appeals, Higher, and Supreme prosecutors into a vertical power chain).
Structural Divergence in the Judicial Reform Bill:
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Feature Venice Commission Draft Serbian Parliamentary Draft
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Appeals Panel 5 independent prosecutors Strict hierarchical chain
from any arbitrary tier. (Higher, Appellate, Supreme).
Legislative Package Incomplete text (Missing Full text containing hidden
transitional clauses). transitional mandates.
International Review Approved under a milder, Weaponized domestically as a
compromise-driven tone. blank check for ruling party.
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The Professional Assessment: ““You can suddenly see references to members coming from appellate prosecution offices, higher prosecution offices, and the Supreme Prosecution Office,”” noted Nemanja Đurić, President of the Judicial Branch Trade Union. ““These are strict hierarchical elements that do not exist in the versions posted on the Ministry of Justice website, which the Venice Commission likely never reviewed because the amendment was snuck in too late.””
Hiding the Transition: “Thimble-Rigging” to Secure Political Power
Legal analysts are equally alarmed by the government’s admission that it completely omitted the “Transitional and Concluding Provisions” of the laws when requesting international evaluation from the Council of Europe body.
These missing clauses dictate exactly how and when the old judicial regime transitions into the new framework—allowing the current political leadership to dictate which loyal prosecutors remain anchored in high-profile positions.
Tanasije Marinković, a prominent professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law, pulled no punches regarding the missing text:
““This entire maneuver amounts to shibicarenje (thimble-rigging/shell games) and buying extra time. The authorities are clearly trying to secure themselves a few more months or years on these judicial seats, fueled by an intense fear of the upcoming elections.””
Executive Defense: Brnabić Claims Sequential Formatting
Speaker of the Parliament Ana Brnabić aggressively dismissed the allegations via a public statement, claiming that the omission of the transitional clauses was standard legislative sequencing. According to Brnabić, the government could only legally formulate the transitional framework after the Venice Commission gave its baseline opinion on the core amendments.
However, judicial unions quickly dismantled this defense, with Đurić challenging the Speaker to name a single historical instance where a country sent a structurally incomplete law to Strasbourg without its concluding provisions. “The answer to that question is simple: it has never happened before,” Đurić stated.
With the Venice Commission remaining silent and refusing to issue an official clarification, opposition figures warn that the structural changes to the “Mrdić Laws” have effectively created a dual reality: an idealized version tailored to satisfy international monitors in Brussels, and a highly restrictive version weaponized domestically to maintain political control over the courts.
