Over the past two years, several people in Kosovo have been arrested on suspicion of spying for Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA). Taken together, the cases point to a broad range of information allegedly sought by Serbian intelligenc from the Kosovo Police and Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) to political developments, elections, members of specific communities and influential individuals.
Some of the cases are still before the courts, while others have already resulted in convictions. They do not, by themselves, prove the existence of a single coordinated BIA operation or network in Kosovo. But they raise an important question: what is BIA seeking, and what can it do with the information once it obtains it?
“The main effort is to gain people—whether for information or for influence through institutions,” Dushan Janjić, founder of the Forum for Ethnic Relations in Belgrade, told Radio Free Europe.
One of the latest cases began proceedings on September 7 at the Basic Court in Pristina.
Fatmir Sheholli is accused of espionage and blackmail. The Special Prosecution of Kosovo alleges that he was recruited by BIA and collected information about political developments, the security situation and the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions. According to the indictment, he also allegedly participated in a plan aimed at compromising Kosovo officials and interfering in the 2025 local elections. Sheholli pleaded not guilty.
According to prosecutors, his phone also contained a photograph of a document titled “Top Secret 2.” The document allegedly described a plan involving the use of Islam to divide Albanians and alter Western perceptions of Kosovo.
However, the authorship and authenticity of the document have not been publicly established. The Islamic Community of Kosovo has rejected the claims contained in it and called for an investigation into its origin and authenticity.
The publication of the document triggered heated reactions on social media, including claims about alleged links between BIA and members of Kosovo’s Muslim community. But the indictment itself does not establish what ultimately happens to the information allegedly collected and passed on to Serbian intelligence.
What does BIA want?
Intelligence experts say that collecting information is only one part of an intelligence service’s work. Equally important is who provides the information, what access that source has, and how the information and networks created around it can later be used.
Daniel Lomas, a professor of intelligence and security at the University of Nottingham, says the first stage is usually information gathering.
Initially, intelligence services seek information about a country’s politics and economy, who holds influence, political rumours and the development of networks across society.
But those networks can later acquire another function: political influence.
What is BIA?
The Security Intelligence Agency, known as BIA, is Serbia’s civilian national security and intelligence service and operates as a special organisation of the Serbian Government.
Under Serbian law, its responsibilities include protecting Serbia’s security, detecting and preventing activities aimed at undermining the constitutional order, and collecting, processing and assessing intelligence relevant to national security.
BIA can also cooperate with foreign intelligence services and international organisations in accordance with Serbian government directives and national security and intelligence policy.
Radio Free Europe contacted BIA for comment on the cases and allegations concerning its activities in Kosovo but received no response.
What information is allegedly being collected?
The indictments filed in Kosovo provide some indications of the types of information allegedly sought.
Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi are accused of collecting and passing on information related to the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency.
According to the indictment, Shabani also collected material concerning the Recak massacre, while Qerimi allegedly gathered information about witnesses connected to the Kosovo Specialist Chambers. Both have pleaded not guilty and their trials are ongoing.
In another case, Fehim Sali was arrested in August on suspicion of espionage for Serbia. Prosecutors allege that he collected and passed on information about certain individuals in Kosovo, including people described by prosecutors as members of Wahhabi circles.
Among those already convicted are Aleksandar Vlajić, who pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years in prison, and Jellena Gjukanović, who was sentenced to six years for espionage.
Janjić says an intelligence service’s interest is not limited to documents or specific data. People who have access to sensitive information can be just as valuable.
A source inside the police, for example, may have access to information unavailable to an ordinary citizen. Such a person could potentially help identify other individuals who might be targeted for recruitment or create opportunities for further operations.
What happens to the information?
Janjić is cautious when asked what specifically happens to information once it reaches BIA.
In principle, he says, information is passed to analytical departments, where it is organised and classified before being assessed and potentially used for political purposes.
He points to blackmail and influence as possible uses.
Lomas explains that information about political figures, institutions and individuals can allow a foreign intelligence service to identify weaknesses and divisions within a government, political party or society.
“Intelligence allows you to open cracks within governments, political parties and society,” Lomas says, because it provides insight into how a particular society can potentially be exploited.
The next stage can involve what the intelligence world calls covert action—moving beyond simply collecting information to taking action based on what has been learned.
That does not mean the espionage cases uncovered in Kosovo prove that BIA is conducting such a coordinated strategy. The criminal proceedings concern the individual responsibility of specific defendants, and many of the prosecution’s allegations have yet to be established through final court judgments.
Radio Free Europe asked Kosovo’s Special Prosecution about the number of people under investigation, indictment or trial for espionage on behalf of Serbia, as well as possible links and common methods among the cases and possible involvement of individuals within public institutions. It received no response.
The Kosovo Intelligence Agency also did not respond to questions about the possible scale of BIA activity in Kosovo and the threat it may pose to Kosovo’s institutions.
Can espionage destabilise Kosovo?
Lomas warns against concluding that espionage alone can destabilise a state.
Foreign intelligence services do not necessarily need to create divisions or grievances themselves. They can identify existing tensions and exploit them.
He uses Russia as an example, pointing to debates over migration in Germany. The concerns themselves were not created by Russia, he argues, but outside actors can amplify existing dissatisfaction, including through social media.
He compares the mechanism to a fire: grievances already exist, while outside interference can add “fuel to the fire,” making them larger and potentially more dangerous.
Lomas does not claim that the cases in Kosovo prove an identical model. But he places the issue in the wider context of the Western Balkans, Russia’s war against Ukraine and its broader confrontation with the West.
In Kosovo, the controversy surrounding the “Top Secret 2” document demonstrated how quickly a sensitive issue can generate polarisation even though the document’s authorship and authenticity remain unresolved.
Janjić also connects intelligence activity with Serbia’s refusal to recognise Kosovo and what he describes as an interest in information that could be used to discredit Kosovo.
“When you do not recognise Kosovo, you have to collect as much negative information as possible about the situation there,” he says.
How can Kosovo protect itself?
For Lomas, protection does not begin and end with identifying and arresting suspected spies.
One important tool is publicly exposing how foreign intelligence services operate. Western European countries have used public disclosure of espionage cases to raise awareness among citizens and institutions about recruitment methods and intelligence risks.
The recent arrests themselves can serve as a warning that foreign intelligence services remain active and that their methods can involve recruitment, information gathering and the development of influence networks.
Another key element is counterintelligence: identifying vulnerable individuals and institutions, detecting recruitment attempts and strengthening information-sharing with international partners.
Janjić also stresses the need to strengthen Kosovo’s intelligence and security capabilities. But, he argues, responsibility does not rest solely with Kosovo’s institutions. NATO, the United States and European partners also have a role in strengthening institutional security standards, improving Kosovo’s capabilities and developing stronger mechanisms for cooperation and intelligence-sharing.
The cases uncovered so far, however, do not establish the full scale of BIA’s possible activity in Kosovo.
It remains publicly unknown how many people may have been recruited, how long their alleged links to Serbian intelligence may have lasted, or how much information may have reached BIA.
For several defendants, the prosecution’s allegations must still be tested in court.
