British historian and Oxford University professor James Pettifer has stated that the time is approaching when key archives will be opened, shedding new light on the Kosovo war and its complex geopolitical background.
Speaking to RTS, the Serbian public broadcaster, Pettifer discussed the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, the strategic motives of the United States, and the transformation of Western attitudes toward the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
NATO’s Operation Was “Confused” but Driven by Regime Change Goals
According to Pettifer, the bombing campaign against Serbia was a “highly confused operation” with diverging objectives within NATO.
“Different parts of NATO wanted different outcomes. Behind the scenes, there was constant pressure to use the war in Kosovo as a tool to topple the Milošević regime,” Pettifer explained.
He added that Washington and London had, from the start, considered regime change in Belgrade a strategic objective — even if this was never stated publicly.
“Most European NATO members, like Italy and Greece, simply wanted the war to end. They feared a refugee crisis that could directly affect their own countries,” he noted.
The U.S. Strategy: Control of the Adriatic and Preventing Russian Influence
Pettifer underlined that, at the time, the United States projected much of its global power through naval dominance. One of its strategic goals was to control or heavily influence the Adriatic coast — from Croatia and Montenegro to Albania and Greece — while preventing Russia from establishing any military presence there.
“In Washington, there was real concern that Russia might secure a base in Montenegro. That was a major issue back then,” he said.
The Turning Point: Washington’s Meeting with the KLA
Pettifer identified Richard Holbrooke’s meeting with KLA representatives as the decisive moment that shifted U.S. policy toward Kosovo.
“After that meeting, there was clearly a major policy change,” he emphasized.
While parts of Washington remained divided, some agencies were firmly focused on dismantling Milošević’s regime and accelerating Yugoslavia’s collapse, while others preferred a slower, more controlled transition.
“The KLA was useful as a catalyst against Belgrade’s government. They were tolerated, if not directly supported,” Pettifer explained.
He noted that after 1996, Kosovo Albanians increasingly turned to military rather than political options, allowing the KLA to grow rapidly in strength, particularly in Deçan and Peja. The chaotic situation in Albania in 1997, he said, made arms smuggling and paramilitary training far easier.
“The Hague Trials Have Discredited International Justice”
Commenting on the ongoing trials of former KLA leaders in The Hague, including Hashim Thaçi and Rexhep Selimi, Pettifer described the process as ineffective and deeply flawed.
“These trials dragged on too long, and the judicial standards in The Hague have been extremely low,” he said.
“Even the United States is now beginning to realize that the conduct of the court has been appallingly poor.”
He argued that the prolonged detentions of KLA leaders have not changed Kosovo’s political landscape, since many citizens view Thaçi as a national hero and martyr.
“Thaçi’s party performed strongly in recent elections despite his imprisonment,” Pettifer noted. “His endurance has strengthened his symbolic status.”
In contrast, Pettifer added, Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s party is losing support, partly due to his vague and inconsistent stance on the Special Court’s trials.
“Ultimately, very little has been achieved. The trials have not transformed politics in the Balkans — just as the Milošević and Šešelj trials did not change Serbia,” he concluded.
“History Is Now Catching Up”
Pettifer believes the opening of archives in the coming years will reveal “many truths long hidden” about the war, the Western intervention, and the complex dynamics of power that shaped Kosovo’s path to independence.
“Today, Serbia is a different country,” he said. “It’s good that this entire era is now seen as history.”
