The recent espionage cases indicate a coordinated effort not merely to gather intelligence, but to undermine Kosovo’s statehood from within.
Kosovo’s Defence Minister Ejup Maqedonci was precise when addressing the Kosovo Intelligence Agency’s (AKI) recent counter-espionage operations. “This is the first time since the war,” he said, “that such a coordinated and all-encompassing operation has taken place.” He publicly commended AKI director Petrit Ajeti and framed Serbia’s intelligence activities as part of a hybrid warfare strategy—backed by Russia—aimed not at conventional military targets, but at delegitimizing Kosovo’s institutions and questioning its sovereignty. “Through disinformation and fake news,” Maqedonci added, “they aim to portray our institutions as incapable of governing effectively.”
His statement served both as a public endorsement of Kosovo’s intelligence capacity and as a doctrinal explanation of the threat facing the country.
What the Record Shows
Maqedonci’s claim of unprecedented operations since 1999 is supported by the record. Before 2024, counter-espionage in Kosovo was sporadic and isolated. Over the last eighteen months, however, a systematic wave of prosecutions has emerged, spanning intelligence collection, law enforcement, and judicial processes.
These cases rely on Article 124 of Kosovo’s Criminal Code, which governs espionage and mandates a minimum five-year sentence. Each case follows a coordinated institutional chain: AKI handles surveillance, Kosovo Police makes arrests, and the Special Prosecution files indictments and prosecutes. Serbia’s Security Information Agency (BIA) has denied involvement, claiming the arrests are politically motivated, but convictions have been recorded.
Aleksandar Vlajić, a Kosovo Serb and former Kosovo Police officer, became in 2025 the first post-war espionage convict in Kosovo, receiving a five-year sentence. Vlajić’s case revealed the broader network: he recruited and managed sources, acting as a link between local assets and BIA structures, including Jelena Djukanović, an OSCE Mission officer in Mitrovica.
Institutional Penetration
Djukanović’s case demonstrates the hybrid dimension Maqedonci described. Her alleged value to Serbian intelligence was institutional rather than military. The indictment claims she forwarded sensitive OSCE documents through Vlajić to BIA and attempted to influence internal OSCE reporting in ways hostile to Kosovo’s state institutions. The Court of Appeals ruled in January 2026 that phone evidence against her is admissible. Her trial is ongoing.
The Long Game
At the other end of the spectrum, Hysri Selimi, a Kosovo Albanian from Gjilan, is alleged to have collaborated with BIA from 2009, targeting former KLA members, war crimes narratives, radical networks, and Kosovo Albanians fighting in Syria for ISIS. Prosecutors claim that in 2015, Selimi joined ISIS on BIA orders to report on compatriots—later serving a prison sentence in Kosovo before allegedly resuming intelligence work. Intercepted communications show consistent contact with BIA handlers, including payments of up to €700 per month.
Selimi’s case illustrates a level of operational sophistication unprecedented in publicly known Serbian intelligence operations against Kosovo: deploying recruits into terrorist organizations to monitor Kosovo citizens.
A Pattern of Targeting
These cases reveal a clear targeting logic. Arrests have included a Kosovo Police lieutenant accused of leaking operational plans and a public commentator charged with transmitting information to BIA-linked contacts. The overarching program appears to have three goals: compromise Kosovo’s operational security, shape narratives in public and media spheres, and manipulate international assessments through credible organizations like the OSCE.
Maqedonci’s Framing
The cases consistently indicate that Serbian intelligence is focused less on conventional intelligence and more on institutional erosion. Security breaches, narrative manipulation, and interference in international assessments align with hybrid warfare tactics aimed at undermining Kosovo’s statehood.
The timing of these prosecutions coincides with heightened NATO and EU attention to hybrid threats in the Western Balkans, situating Kosovo’s experience within a regional security context. AKI’s development since 2009, combined with coordinated prosecutorial and judicial capacity, enabled the 2024–2026 wave to meet the operational challenge.
While much evidence remains confidential, the public record of prosecutions confirms the persistence and systemic nature of the threat. Kosovo’s counterintelligence and judicial apparatus are now actively engaging a sophisticated, ongoing challenge.
These cases demonstrate that Serbia’s espionage network in Kosovo is less about collecting secrets and more about strategically weakening the institutions and international credibility of a neighboring state.
