“There are reasons to say that he is already finished,” Žarko Korać, a former deputy prime minister in the government of Zoran Đinđić, told the Croatian newspaper Jutarnji list.
Developments in Belgrade suggest that a sense of victory is already prevailing among forces opposed to Vučić, who are expected to begin celebrating in the streets immediately after polling stations close.
The reason is high voter turnout, which suggests that Aleksandar Vučić may be losing ground and, apparently, will be unable to compensate for the loss even through widespread electoral manipulation, although he has also taken precautions to avoid leaving everything to chance. This time, however, he faces a particularly difficult challenge.
“The queues to vote are so long, and turnout by midday is around 35%, that we can already say Aleksandar Vučić’s time is up,” said Korać, a retired professor at the University of Belgrade and former deputy prime minister under Zoran Đinđić.
Since the early morning hours, the atmosphere has been marked by queues forming even before polling stations opened. Sociologists say that such a situation generally indicates high turnout, suggesting that voters are seeking change. Participation appears to be heading towards a level that even Vučić will struggle to surpass.
Judging by the first hours of voting, Vučić may need to reconsider his next moves urgently, as developments do not appear to be going in his favour.
The fact that several media outlets aligned with his government, including Informer, Kurir, Alo, Politika and B92, are reporting numerous irregularities at polling stations and alleged threats against pro-Vučić voters, while students and independent media are being accused of violating the election silence, suggests that a possible strategy is being prepared to challenge the election results on the grounds of alleged irregularities. Informer, regarded as one of Vučić’s most powerful media allies, is already highlighting these alleged irregularities, suggesting awareness of the direction in which the electoral process may be heading.
At the height of his political strength, Aleksandar Vučić received around two million votes. This time, he would need at least another 400,000 to 500,000 votes to claim victory. If turnout reaches 65% to 70% or higher, as the current trend suggests, he may be unable to make up that difference. If queues at polling stations continue — and there is little reason to expect them to diminish — it may already be possible to speak of a potential defeat for Vučić.
According to some reports, in the event of defeat, he could provoke unrest and disorder in an attempt to declare a state of emergency and thereby postpone his political downfall, at least temporarily. He might insist that the elections were irregular or claim victory despite the students refusing to recognise the results, prolonging the uncertainty and pushing the country towards a crisis and potential chaos.
The question is to what extent the police, military, intelligence community and his alleged paramilitary groups, known as ćaciji, would be willing to defend him, given that many of these actors also have an interest in protecting their own positions.
Nevertheless, considering what Korać characterises as Vučić’s authoritarian and nepotistic system, which he alleges is marked by corruption, clientelism and links to criminal structures, the question remains whether the Serbian president would be willing to relinquish power peacefully and move into opposition. The independent Serbian weekly Radar published allegations concerning these structures shortly before the elections.
Having incorporated numerous people into a system based on loyalty and personal benefits, while retaining control over the repressive apparatus, institutions and much of the media, Vučić could attempt to delay what his opponents consider inevitable and trigger unrest regardless of the election results, Korać argued.
However, if Vučić — as Korać believes possible — declares victory despite such high turnout, this would raise serious questions about potential electoral manipulation. Such an outcome could bring large numbers of dissatisfied people into the streets, particularly in major urban centres such as Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš, where many voters may have supported the opposition.
In that scenario, the key question would be how the security apparatus, which Korać describes as being firmly under Vučić’s control, would respond.
Vučić might also accept defeat but do everything possible to complicate the transfer of power, particularly if he feels threatened. This could include obstructing the formation of a new government while considering his options, including possible departure from the country. In this context, Minsk and Moscow, via Bratislava, have been mentioned as potential destinations.
Korać described this as one possible scenario, arguing that Vučić’s opponents have long threatened him with imprisonment and prosecution, making it difficult to imagine that he would willingly expose himself to such risks.
The claims and scenarios outlined above reflect Korać’s assessment and allegations reported by Jutarnji list; they should not be understood as independently established facts or confirmed election outcomes.
